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ABSTRACT
BLACK CODES RE-ENVISIONED: THE DRED SCOTT MAJORITY OPINION AS
AN ANTIBLACK PERFORMATIVE SPEECH ACT
Tiffany Dillard-Knox
November 23, 2021
This dissertation is a discursive analysis of the decision in the Dred Scott v
Sandford, 1857 case written by Chief Justice Roger Taney. It begins with an overview of
the literature on performative speech acts, focusing on the aspects of performatives that
relate to Louis Miron and Jonathan Xavier Inda’s thesis that race is a performative speech
act. Breaking from their use of race as the analytic, this analysis is situated within a
black/nonblack paradigm. This provides a framework that focuses on the unique ways in
which the discourse of the text enacts, accumulates and renders blackness fungible. The
latter part of the dissertation argues that the Dred Scott decision does the work of
extending colonial discourses into the future by flattening blackness and embedding the
technologies of antiblackness within what I call double-speak.
The discourse analysis was performed in three steps. The first was to identify the
use of identity markers and their corresponding descriptors. These identity markers were
compared/contrasted and analyzed to get a better sense of how these various identities
were enacted within the text. The second identified the use of universal terms and
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phrases. These universal terms and phrases were then analyzed to determine the
capacity for blacks to assimilate via an inclusion/exclusion framework. The third and
final step was to identify the moments of antiblackness as determined by the tenets of
accumulation and fungibility.
In the end the majority opinion can be described as an antiblack performative
speech act that named blackness, reiterated the representations of blackness, and
generated the force of authority that allows for further citation of those representations of
blackness. Furthermore, the analysis provided a means for exploring the role of Fanon’s
racial corporeal schema as a linguistic marker that carries the logics of slavery into the
future without having to use the language of slavery. Finally, utilizing antiblackness as a
theoretical intervention, I was able to identify a gap in the literature on the effects of
performatives. This effect I call double-speak, which happens when there is
contradiction across groups as to the successfulness or unsuccessfulness of a single
performative utterance.
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INTRODUCTION

As I write this dissertation, the United States is on fire. Protests have erupted all
over the country during a global pandemic over a disease much greater than COVID-19.
Antiblackness is the name of the infectious disease that has run rampant in this country
for several centuries, with no vaccine in sight. Although there are many who would say
that we have come a long way since slavery, the myriad of unarmed black men and
women killed by the police state, with no justice served—too many to list here—over the
last few decades have once again sparked a “long hot summer.” This, however, is the
exact result that one would/should expect when the history of the country is undergirded
by a discourse of antiblack sentiment. The language of the country provides a roadmap
of divisiveness and violence and the target is blackness.
On May 1, 2020, President Donald Trump tweeted, “The Governor of Michigan
should give a little, and put out the fire. These are very good people, but they are angry.
They want their lives back again, safely! See them, talk to them, make a deal.” This was
in reference to a group of armed white protestors who were rallying against the stay-athome orders issued by the Governor of Michigan, orders that were being issued all across
the country—the world really—in order to control the spread of the deadly disease
known as COVID-19.
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Fast forward to the end of May 2020 when protests began erupting throughout the
country over a series of killings of unarmed black men and a black woman—Ahmaud
Arbery, George Floyd, and Breonna Taylor—at the hands of police and former police. In
response to the protests in Minnesota the President tweeted, “…These THUGS are
dishonoring the memory of George Floyd, and I won’t let that happen. Just spoke to
Governor Tim Walz and told him that the military is with him all the way. Any difficulty
and we will assume control but, when the looting starts, the shooting starts. Thank you!”
The rhetorical difference between the two tweets is significant and important to
the moment that we find ourselves in in this country. The contrast between the use of
“very fine people” in one instance and “THUGS” in another colors the perception and
responses to each act of protest and the people involved. These are not inconsequential
descriptors. There are material implications, often fatal. Unfortunately, this is not new
and President Trump is not the first.
While the above example highlights an obvious and overt distinction, most of the
more recent racial rhetoric in the United States have been instances of covert divisiveness
dating back to the 1960s. The advice of Republican campaign strategist, Lee Atwater
when he said of the “Southern Strategy” (Lamis, 1990, 26) was,

[It’s a matter of] how abstract you handle the race thing. In other words, you start
out…Now y’all aren’t quoting me on this…you start out in 1954 by saying,
‘Nigger, nigger, nigger.’ By 1968 you can’t say nigger—that hurts you, backfires.
So, you say stuff like, uh, forced busing, states’ rights, and all that stuff. And
you’re getting so abstract now, you’re talking about cutting taxes, and all these
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things you’re talking about are totally economic things and a byproduct of them
is, blacks get hurt worse than whites… ‘We want to cut this,’ is much more
abstract than even the busing thing, uh, and a hell of a lot more abstract than
‘nigger, nigger’

Richard Nixon, in conjunction with Harry Dent and others, devised a rhetorical campaign
that appealed to the racist sentiments of southern voters. Relying on the rhetoric of “law
and order” following the urban riots—rebellions—of the late 1960s and appealing to the
racial fears and antagonisms was central to the “Southern Strategy1.” However, it had to
be done surreptitiously. Nixon stated, "that you have to face the fact that the whole
problem is really the Blacks. The key is to devise a system that recognized this while not
appearing to (Alexander, 2010, 44)". According to Michelle Alexander (2010) in her
book, The New Jim Crow, Nixon’s campaign dedicated seventeen speeches solely to the
topic of law and order, one of his television ads explicitly called on voters to reject the
lawlessness of civil rights activists and embrace order in the United States (46).
Ronald Reagan continued with the law and order rhetoric and added the “War on
Drugs.” He made implicit racial appeals on crime, welfare, taxes, and states’ rights. The
colorblind frame of his rhetoric made the racial dimension of his language impossible to
prove. He was afforded plausible deniability due to the coded nature of his racial
appeals. Reagan made popular the terms “welfare queen,” “crack whores,” “crack

Term used in Matthew Lassiter’s book, “The Silent Majority: Suburban Politics in the Sunbelt South,” to
describe the political strategy used to realign the Republican party and usher in a new defacto segregation
in the United States.
1
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babies,” and “gangbangers” and did so in such a way that they automatically signified
black.
George H. W. Bush’s most famous racial appeal was the Willie Horton ad that
featured a dark-skinned black man, a convicted murderer who escaped while on work
furlough and allegedly raped and murdered a white woman in her home. It was used to
depict the effects of politicians being “soft on crime.” Once elected, Bush continued the
drug war theme and even used it to militarize domestic drug law enforcement. The
rhetorical strategy worked to influence public opinion so much so that actual drug
statistics did not correlate with public concern of illegal drug activity (Alexander, 2010).
Bill Clinton deployed a “get tough on crime” rhetoric that matched the anti-black
legislation that he passed. Having one of the most detrimental presidencies for blacks
since Reconstruction, Clinton passed the three-strikes law, minimal sentencing, and
signed into law the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act,
which destroyed the effectiveness of previous welfare reform.
George W. Bush expanded the reach of the rhetorical strategy to include
immigrants with his War on Terror rhetoric. According to Ryannon McLeod (2010),
“George W. Bush was able to formulate a narrative in which the enemies of the United
States were not merely dehumanized, but cast as monstrous, murderous entities whose
sole purpose was to destroy the American way of life (1).” Although Bush never names
this “enemy” of the State, the relationship between the War on Terror and 9/11
automatically creates the visual image of enemy.
The strategy of racial rhetoric came full circle with the campaign/presidency of
Donald Trump. His widely known campaign slogan covers all of the strategies that came
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before him, “Make America Great, Again.” Included in that one simple phrase are
messages of racism, sexism, homophobia, anti-immigration, conservatism, corporatism,
and law and order politics.
However, this has not been just a strategy used to win races for political office, it
has been used by the media to differentially describe whites and blacks engaging in
similar acts. During media reports on Hurricane Katrina, photos of people perceived to be
white taking items from stores were labeled “finding” items from a store while people
perceived to be black were labeled as “looting” from a grocery store (Ralli, 2005).
Eduardo Bonilla-Silva (2014) offers one of the most comprehensive
understandings of how colorblind rhetoric functions in the United States beyond
politicians and media to produce Racism without Racists. Racism without racists means
that the substance of racism that has historically defined America’s past still exists, the
difference is found in the covert, deniable nature that racism manifests in its
contemporary formulations. Bonilla-Silva outlines four frames through which colorblind
racism manifests: abstract liberalism, naturalization, cultural racism, and minimization of
racism.
Abstract liberalism is found in the language of meritocracy. Those who believe
that affirmative action programs are no longer needed and in fact justify instances of
“reverse racism” fall into this particular category. An example of this would be the
recent investigations by the Department of Justice into institutions of higher education
such as, Harvard, over claims of discrimination regarding admissions. A recent article in
the Harvard Crimson (Franklin and Zwickel, 2018) reported that the Justice Department’s
civil rights division sought to investigate instances of discrimination against Asian
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American students and reverse discrimination against white students. At the same time,
there is no active investigations looking into the discriminatory admission practices of
legacy admits at these same institutions.
Naturalization is the idea that people naturally cluster into like groups. The
language of naturalization is used to justify things such as residential segregation without
ever considering the effects of housing discrimination. Residential segregation leads to
the creation of myths such as “black on black” crime that is heavily circulated in the
media when discussing intra-racial violence in black communities. Unfortunately, there
is no similar phrase denoting “white on white crime”.
Those who criticize the morality values, work ethic and other behaviors as
justifications for inequality invoke notions of cultural racism. Cultural racism stems from
the 1960s “culture of poverty2” theory, developed by Oscar Lewis in 1966, and rhetoric
that leads to victim blaming. Arguments that justify police brutality by saying, “if they
would have just obeyed the police officer, none of this would have happened”. Yet,
George Floyd was not resisting arrest when he was killed, Ahmuad Arbery was jogging
when he was chased down and killed, and Breonna Taylor was asleep in her own home
when she was gunned down and killed. Similar acts of victim blaming occur when
discussing government assistance, “they need to get a job and work like the rest of us”.
The first example exhibits an underlying moral critique while the second is a judgment of
work ethic. Neither of the two examples put things like police brutality and poverty into
their proper historical context.

2

The culture of poverty theory argues that the values of people in poverty perpetuate their condition,
sustaining a cycle of poverty across generations.
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Lastly, are those who believe that racism no longer exists and those who believe
that we are “better off” than we were in the past. These arguments of a post-racial
America invoke ideas that equality exists and that oppression was something that
happened over a century ago. This was a comment made by former NFL player and
coach, Mike Ditka (Schwab, 2017). Although that was the most extreme part of his rant,
the rest of what he was quoted saying includes other frames of colorblind rhetoric
(emphasis mine):
I don’t know what social injustices [there] have been … You have to look at a
person for what he is and what he stands for and how he produces — not by the
color of his skin. That has never had anything to do with anything,” Ditka
said. “But, all of a sudden, it has become a big deal now — about oppression.
There has been no oppression in the last 100 years that I know of. Now
maybe I’m not watching it as carefully as other people. I think the opportunity is
there for everybody — race, religion, creed, color, nationality. If you want to
work, if you want to try, if you want to put effort in, you can accomplish anything.
And we have watched that throughout our history of our country.

Unfortunately, not all “race talk” is color-blind or neutral. In fact, antiblack rhetoric
is often targeted and intentional. This research will examine one such instance of
targeted antiblack discourse that has laid the foundation for and intensified the oft fatal
consequences of all other instances since, the majority opinion in the Dred Scott v
Sandford case of 1857.
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Dred Scott was a Missouri slave. Sold to Army surgeon John Emerson in Saint Louis
around 1833, Scott was taken to Illinois, a free State, and on to the free Wisconsin
Territory before returning to Missouri. When Emerson died in 1843, Scott sued
Emerson's widow for his freedom in the Missouri Supreme Court, claiming that his
residence in the free soil of Illinois made him a free man. After defeat in State courts,
Scott brought suit in a local federal court. Eleven years after Scott's initial suit, the case
came before the U.S. Supreme Court.
The lawsuits submitted on behalf of Dred and Harriet Scott in the 1840s and 1850s
were to determine the status of the Scotts as either free persons or slaves. By the final
rendering of the U.S. Supreme Court in 1857, the courts had decided that Dred Scott and
by proxy, Harriet Scott and their children, were slaves who never had the right to file a
suit in the court of law. However, the majority opinion written by Judge Roger Taney did
more than just render a decision regarding the status of the Scotts. Instead, Taney set a
legal precedent for the status of all blacks in the United States, free and enslaved, by
concluding that blacks were “so far inferior that they have no rights which the white man
is bound to respect (U.S. Constitution: A Reader, 2012, 488).” This was the first time
that the status of free blacks and slaves (read: black slaves) were legally determined to be
the same, supplementing “blacks” for “slaves.” As a result, free blacks were stripped of
all access to citizenship, thus personhood within the law, a status that only black slaves
previously occupied. The development of the Dred Scott case in tandem with the
discourse used in writing the majority opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court decision is
significant to understanding the manner by which blackness, not slaveness, was
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discursively codified to be synonymous with property, or what Frank Wilderson (2010)
calls “sentient objects”.
This historical moment is significant because prior to this decision, free blacks
occupied various degrees of differing statuses than black slaves in some parts of the
United States. Post this decision they became one. This unification point created the
foundation for the paradox from slavery to freedom that Saidiya Hartman (1997)
describes in her text, Scenes of Subjection: Terror, Slavery, and Self-Making in
Nineteenth-Century America. A paradox which she describes by explaining, “the
transformation of black subjectivity effected by emancipation is described as nascent
individualism not simply because blacks were considered less than human and a hybrid
of property and person prior to emancipation but because the abolition of slavery
conferred on them the inalienable rights of man and brought them into the fold of liberal
individualism. Prior to this, legal precedents like State v. Mann and Dred Scott v.
Sandford made the notions of blacks’ rights and black citizenship untenable, if not
impossible (117).”
In some ways human subjectivities are intimately tied to nationality, thus citizenship
status. Therefore, any attempts to articulate black subjectivity must begin with the
untangling of blackness and slaveness. Understanding the origin of the entanglement is
the first step. I argue that the nexus of this entanglement can be found within the text of
the Dred Scott decision. As an authoritative discursive text, the Dred Scott decision has
the power to function as the mechanism that constitutes the subject position for blacks
which then gets taken up by society and iterated in everyday speech. This process can be
understood in terms of what linguistic scholars refer to as a performative speech act.
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Therefore, the goal of this dissertation is to analyze the Dred Scott decision, specifically
the majority opinion given by Judge Roger Taney, to determine if it could be categorized
as an antiblack performative speech act.
Chapter One will examine the manner in which discourse is used to constitute subject
positions through the use of performative speech acts. Specifically, this chapter will
explore the theoretical development of race as a performative speech act established by
Louis Miron and Jonathan Xavier Inda (2000). The chapter explores naming, iteration
and the force of authority as the three primary aspects of performatives that constitute and
maintain particular subject positions. Performative speech act theory is a solid starting
point for examining race, language and subject constitution. However, this chapter will
challenge Miron and Inda’s conclusion regarding the possibilities for the rearticulation of
blackness within the gaps and fissures of discourse by arguing that blacks occupy a
unique structural position that does not get captured in the theory of race as a
performative speech act.
From there, chapter two will lay out the theoretical foundation for understanding the
nature and extent of that unique structural position which is often obscured under the
larger framework of race. This chapter begins by exploring George Yancey’s African
American Alienation Thesis in order to posit the black/nonblack binary as an alternative
paradigmatic lens to the white/nonwhite binary so often used by race scholars. The next
section will include a discussion of the difference between conflictual power relations
and antagonistic power dynamics, while simultaneously situating blacks within the frame
of the latter. It is from this understanding that the chapter moves into an exploration of

10

the two primary tenets of what has been dubbed by Afropessimist scholars as
antiblackness, accumulation and fungibility.
Chapter three lays out the methodological steps taken to conduct a discourse analysis
of the majority opinion rendered in the Dred Scott decision of 1857. The discourse
analysis seeks to answer the following question: Is the majority opinion in the Dred Scott
decision an antiblack performative speech act? The analysis will consist of three major
parts: identifying identity markers and the descriptors that complement those markers,
examining the use of universal terms and phrases, and identifying the moments of
accumulation and fungibility of blackness. The results will be presented in the following
chapter.
The final chapter will posit a theory of antiblack performative speech acts. As I
conceive it, antiblack performative speech acts are similar to Miron and Inda’s theory of
race as a performative speech act. However, the point of divergence between the two has
significant implications on the function of performative speech acts in relation to
blackness. The introduction of an alternative theory of power shifts the dynamics in
such a way that produces an effect I call double-speak. The concept of double-speak
offers a starting point for understanding the relationship between blackness and the world
in new ways. The second implication is that the racial corporeal schema acts as a
linguistic marker within the process of iteration. The racial corporeal schema blocks the
possibility for rearticulation of blackness in ways that differ significantly from other
subject positions. From there, the chapter will explore ideas around ontology, agency,
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relationality and subjectivities3.

The chapter will conclude with suggestions for future

research within the study of language and antiblackness that has the potential to transcend
the current academic discourses surrounding language and race.

3

While there will not be an exhaustive discussion surrounding these topics within this dissertation, it is
important to speak to these questions to some degree. Given the fact that I challenge Miron and Inda’s
conclusion about the possibilities of rearticulation for blacks, I find it necessary to clarify that I do not take
the position that blacks are forever doomed to the fate of that which has named, described and positioned
them. I am an optimistic-realist and believe that hope is necessary to sustain black life. However, we must
be hyper-critical of the role that language plays in the maintenance of the structure of antiblackness. As
such, antiblackness as an analytic is critically important to understanding black positionality while at the
same time, should not be understood to represent all that black life is or is to become.
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CHAPTER ONE: LITERATURE REVIEW
Race as a Performative Speech Act

Louis Miron and Jonathan Xavier Inda (2000) proposed a theory that articulated
race as a kind of speech act whereby they argue that race is not a fact of nature, rather a
reiterated enactment of norms that retroactively construct the appearance of race as a
static essence. This process of reiteration occurs through discourse which they define
according to Stuart Hall (1992) as being both language and practice. In other words,
discourse is not purely a linguistic phenomenon but is embodied in institutions, rituals
and so forth. As such, discourse operates to constitute racial subjects through its material
embodiment within institutions. In order to understand how Miron and Inda arrived at
such a theory it is important to provide some background knowledge of the history and
development of performative speech act theory. Given the expansiveness of the literature
on performativity and speech act theory, it is necessary to limit the review of the
literature to just the scholarship that is critical to understanding race as a performative
speech act as proposed by Miron and Inda. Their theoretical development is built on
three fundamental elements of performative speech act theory; the process of naming
(Foucault, 1979), the process of iteration (Derrida, 1972), and the force of authority
(Butler, 1988). Prior to that, we must first understand what is a performative speech act
at its most basic level.
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Philosopher J.L. Austin delivered the 1955 William James Lectures from a series of
ongoing notes that began as a part of his Oxford Lecture series, Words and Deeds.
These notes were transcribed and published in the 1962 text, How to do Things with
Words. It was this seminal text that initiated a scholarly discussion around what Austin
called performative utterances, or simply put, performatives. He argued that, “it has
come to be seen that many specially perplexing words embedded in apparently
descriptive statements do not serve to indicate some specially odd additional feature in
the reality reported, but to indicate (not to report) the circumstances in which the
statement is made or reservations to which it is subject or the way in which it is to be
taken and the like (3).” Austin challenged the prior philosophical assumption that
utterances are solely descriptive (Saussure, 1916; Bloomfield, 1933), or that they are only
used for the statement of falsifiable facts—which he calls constatives. He argued instead,
that there is another category of statements, called performatives, which do not describe,
report or constate anything at all but perform an act through the very process of uttering
said statement. Put another way, to utter a sentence is to perform some action. An
example would be to say ‘I bet five dollars on horse three.’ In saying the words ‘I bet’
one has not only made a statement about betting but also performed the bet, assuming the
appropriate circumstances are met, such as the bet being received. When two people say
‘I do’ during a wedding ceremony, that too is considered a performative utterance.
As Austin further advanced his theory of performatives, he began to develop the
conditions for successful and unsuccessful performatives. All of the conditions are not
necessary to explore here, as there are many, but there are two things worth noting. First,
Austin excluded cases that he identified as “nonserious” or “parasitic,” instances in which
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the speech acts are used outside of their normal or proper contexts. Second, while Austin
deals with instances of mutual exclusivity, he does not speak to the extremely important
instances of contradiction, which will be discussed in more detail later4. For now, let’s
explore the significance of Austin’s excluded cases and the first of the three fundamental
elements of Miron and Inda’s theory of racial performatives, iterability.
In Lecture II, Austin claimed that happy performatives require that six conditions5
be met. If one or more of those conditions are not met, then the performative utterance is
said to be unhappy, or infelicitous, whereas those infelicities are not a question of
true/false but of successfulness. Austin recognized the myriad of ways that a
performative utterance can go wrong but chose to exclude those instances as “nonserious,” “parasitic,” or “non-ordinary.” In contrast, Philosopher Jacques Derrida (1972)
argued that those excluded instances are integral to the successfulness of any class of
performatives through his notion of iterability, defined by the capacity to be repeatable.
Nonserious and parasitic speech, Derrida argues, is simply a citation of a serious speech
act—a repetition of an accepted conventional procedure. Rather than serious and
nonserious speech acts belonging to separate and opposing orders, Derrida concludes that
an utterance can only take place if it is iterable, can be repeated, quoted or cited in a

4

Instances of contradiction are important to understanding the concept of double-speak that is laid out in
Chapter 5.
5
The six conditions are as follows:
(A. 2) the particular persons and circumstances in a given case must be appropriate for the invocation
of the particular procedure invoked.
(B. I) The procedure must be executed by all participants both correctly and
(B. 2) completely.
(T.1) Where, as often, the procedure is designed for use by persons having certain thoughts or feelings, or
for the inauguration of certain consequential conduct on the part of any participant, then a person
participating in and so invoking the procedure must in fact have those thoughts or feelings, and
the participants must intend so to conduct themselves, and further
(T. 2) must actually so conduct themselves subsequently.
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variety of serious and nonserious contexts, making them different kinds of iteration
within the category of general iterability.
Miron and Inda take up Derrida’s theory of general iterability and apply it to race
in order to contend that this process of iteration is used within discourse to “procure a
naturalized effect through repeated reference” to the racialized subject (99). As such,
racial performativity is not a singular act of racial subject constitution but a reiterative
practice through which discourse brings about the effect that it names. They maintain
that race itself is an empty category that alone has no connotative capacity but instead
“retroactively constitutes and naturalizes the groupings to which it refers (99).” This is
not to argue that race is static in meaning but as an empty category has the capacity to be
defined and redefined over time. However, the process of iterability gives the term race
its naturalized force. Over time there have been various iterations of race from biological
to cultural but despite the differences in definition, the category of race itself has endured.
Its endurance has come not as a result of a single act of racial subject constitution but as a
reiterative practice effectuated through discourse. In this way, race is not a constative
utterance—statement of fact—but a performative utterance.
Another significant aspect of Derrida’s theory of iterability is the idea that
performatives can successfully function despite the fact that certain utterances or aspects
of utterances are not present, which he calls the structure of absence theory. He argued
that supplementation and representation act as markers. Thus, the speaker, receiver,
original context, or intention do not have to be present in order for a performative to
function successfully. Instead, the speaker, receiver, context, and intention of the original
utterance are presupposed as a result of its repetition. This is evidenced by a 2008 study
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conducted by Phillip Goff et. al which examined historical representations and how they
create implicit contemporary associations. They found that while historical
representations of blacks as ape-like have largely disappeared in the United States, a
mental association between blacks and apes remains. This perduring association
prompted Goff et al. to conduct six studies in order to assess the extent of the black-ape
association. They found that the association does exist. Additionally, the association is
not based on explicit knowledge of the historical representations. Next, they found that
there is no longer an explicit association in the media to describe blacks as ape but there
does exist metaphorically coded language. Finally, they found that these associations
continue to justify violence against blacks and impact the judgement of jurors, even in
life or death cases.
Miron and Inda highlight Michel Foucault’s discursive approach to
representation—naming—to explain how the process of presupposition becomes
embedded into the fabric of society. Foucault believed that representation was based on
relations of power instead of relations of meaning. Using war as the analytic frame to
understand how subjects are constituted, Foucault situated his theory of representation
within a paradigm of conflict in order to highlight the violence associated with the
process of subject constitution through representation. Using this frame demystifies the
neutrality by which we come to understand language. Rather than studying language
itself, Foucault opted to examine discourse as a system of representation. Similar to
Hall’s definition of discourse, Foucault describes it as 'a group of statements which
provide a language for talking about -a way of representing the knowledge about -a
particular topic at a particular historical moment.... Discourse is about the production of
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knowledge through language. But ... since all social practices entail meaning. And
meanings shape and influence what we do -our conduct -all practices have a discursive
aspect' (Foucault, 1972). In other words, discourse is about language and practice and
nothing acquires meaning outside of discourse.
Locating discourse within the context of historical development, Foucault moves
away from an ahistorical examination of language. This is significant because rather than
understanding subject positions as knowable facts, one can instead trace their naming and
development through the discourse that produced them and attached to them particular
meaning(s) over space and time. Put differently, subjects are 'constituted by all that was
said, in all the statements that named it, divided it up, described it, explained it, traced its
development, indicated its various correlations, judged it, and possibly gave it speech by
articulating, in its name, discourses that were to be taken as its own' (Foucault, 1972).
But how does a society determine which discourses get taken up and circulated as truth or
fact?
Foucault argued that there is an inextricable link between knowledge and power.
First, he argued that not only is knowledge always a form of power but power is
implicated in the questions of whether and in what circumstances knowledge is to be
applied or not. Knowledge is not an absolute Truth but becomes true through its
application in society. What is believed to be known—knowledge—creates the context
for when, how, and to whom power gets applied. Knowledge, once applied has real
effects that allow that very knowledge to become true. In other words, knowledge
presupposes and constitutes power relations. Second, Foucault proposes a new
conception of power that rejects the notion that power is always top-down and negative.
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Instead, he contends that power circulates and can be productive. While recognizing the
dominance present within the state, Foucault argues that everyone in society is entangled
within the circulation of power, it permeates every site of social existence. In this sense,
power is a productive network that circulates through the whole social body.
Understanding knowledge and power in this manner provides a lens by which we
come to understand subject constitution. The body, subject, is produced within discourse
according to different discursive formations circulated through a network of power
relations. Gender Studies scholar Judith Butler (1988) does similar analysis in her work
on gender constitution. She situates her work in the context of the phenomenological
distinction between the natural facts of the physical body and the active constitution of
the bodily experience. In doing so, Butler reaffirms Foucault’s description of the relation
between knowledge, power and the body to be one of embodiment or “that through which
meaning is performed or enacted (521).” She argues that power does not cease at the
moment a subject is constituted but through embodied repetition, a subject is constituted
and reconstituted time and time again gaining what she calls, the force of authority.
Much like Butler’s contention on gender reconstitution, Miron and Inda argue for
the possibility of reacrticulating particular racialized subjects. Recalling the three
elements of Miron and Inda’s theory—naming, iterability, and force of authority—they
conclude that “no scheme of racial domination can be a systemic totality predestined to
hold racialized subjects in subordinate positions (101).” They contend that there are gaps
and fissures that open up during the process of iteration that allows for the performance
of normalization to be subverted. Recognizing the possibility of subversion, I argue that
the effects of such aberrations will be minimal for blacks. This point I take up in greater
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detail later but for now let’s look at the example that they follow up with to describe the
rearticulatory process. They use the historicity of the term “black” as the example in
which they describe and argue that,
“The term black, to the extent as it has historically been associated with pathology
and insult has operated as a discursive practice whose effect has been to shame
the subject it names. The performative acts through which such shaming
interpellations have taken place and authorized varying sets of racial relations
have been of necessity repetitions. The idea here is that a performative act of
racial shaming and constitution succeeds only insofar as ‘that action echoes prior
actions, and accumulates the force of authority through the repetition or citation
of a prior, set of authoritative practices’ (Butler, 1993). This means that the term
black has historically derived its force to constitute racial subjects through the
repeated invocation by which it has become linked to degredation,
pathologization, and scorn…One could argue, then, that the fact that this
reiteration is necessary is a sign that the shaming of a subject is never complete,
that the shaming of a racial subject is a never-ending process…it means that the
racial subject is open to the possibility of resignification, that the term ‘black’ is
open to the prospect of being rearticulated otherwise (101).”
In this example, they argue that the Black Power Movement took the term black from its
attachment to a history that linked black with degradation and shame and reconstituted
the term as a sign of pride.
While there is so much to unpack within this single example, such as the fact that
the term “black” was simultaneously introduced with the word “power” and thus meant
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more than just a symbol of pride, I choose here to discuss only the effects associated with
the possibility for rearticulation. The ordering of the above example is backwards and
results in an illusion of possibilities. The term “black” was used to signify pride in
contrast to the other terms used at the time—negro and nigger—which were the
commonly used terms that signified degradation and pathology. The goal of Stokley
Carmichael and others was to create a new representation within the fissures of iteration
by “radically redefining the relationship between blacks and American society (Joseph,
2006, 2).” Unfortunately, the term became appropriated by those in power and reattached
to the initial meanings ascribed to the black racial subject.
Hortense Spillers (1987) offers some insight into the lack of impact that
rearticulation has for blacks regarding the power to name. She argues in her seminal text,
Mama’s Baby, Papa’s Maybe: An American Grammar, the right to name for those
considered captives in the New World was stripped of them. Not only in terms of literal
names, such as the scene in the film “Roots” where Kunta Kinte is forced to recognize his
“new name” Toby, but descriptive naming as well. These new names carry with them a
particular spacio-temporal context. For those being renamed, a part of them is being
erased and potentially lost for generations to come. Even when Malcolm Little changed
his name to Malcolm X he was not able to recover that which was lost. Erasure is only
one such effect. Distortion is another. Naming provides the power of distortion—an
example would be Reagan’s use of the “welfare queen” trope to describe low-income
women, particularly black women and women of color. This distortion occurs when the
name given triggers particular associations that do not describe that which is named but
intends to energize an alternative narrative.
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Spillers continues, those names “embedded in bizarre axiological ground,
demonstrate a sort of telegraphic coding; they are markers so loaded with mythical
prepossession that there is no easy way for the agents buried beneath them to come clean
(65).” When these names become a part of the public register, they become signifiers
that carry contextualized meanings with every use. The argument here is that those
meanings carry with them a particular function. They are not benign but transfer the
particular sociohistorical order that has been assigned to them across time.

In essence,

this meaning never changes tense. It is always considered in present tense. Take Dr.
Martin Luther King, Jr. for example, he is currently known as “the dreamer.” This name,
this meaning was attached to him following his assassination. The rhetoric from his “I
Have a Dream” speech was chosen as his memorialized persona, even though it was not
the last speech he ever gave. It became the safe way to ascribe meaning to his life for the
American social order. In his final address, King spoke of withdrawal of economic
support to “redistribute the pain” and investment into black institutions6. Instead, “peace
and dreams” was the chosen narrative. MLK, Jr. will forever be known as the dreamer,
not the man who advocated a significant disruption to the capitalist system through
wealth redistribution.
When naming is understood in tandem with the process of iteration, it becomes
more evident that the process of rearticulation for blacks becomes harder to achieve.
Using Daniel P. Moynihan’s (1965) use of the phrase “Negro Family7,” Spillers contends

Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr delivered the speech “I’ve Been to the Mountaintop” in Memphis, TN in
support of the striking sanitation workers at the Mason Temple on April 3, 1968. A transcript of the speech
can be found at: https://www.afscme.org/about/history/mlk/mountaintop.
7
Moynihan was appointed to a position within the U.S. Department of Labor and hired to develop policy
for the Johnson administration for its “War on Poverty.” The 1965 report on the status of the Negro Family
was part of this work. As this report was highly critical of the “matriarchal structure of black culture”, a
6
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that the phrase “borrows its narrative energies from the grid of associations, from the
semantic and iconic folds buried deep in the collective past, that come to surround and
signify the captive person (69).” Memory and rememory are two of those “iconic folds.”
What one remembers becomes part of their narrative, aspects of the stories passed down
to future generations. Therefore, memory and rememory are an integral part of the
naming and iteration processes, as well as, social configurations across time. Memories,
however, do not belong simply to those who have experienced certain people, places,
events, moments, etc. Memories become visuals of stories that are passed down from
generation to generation. With each and every story that is told, the hearer creates a
visual in their mind that allows them to better experience the story. Those visuals
become codified, connected to that story, and the hearer then has the capacity to recall
those visuals with every remembrance of the story which inspired them. In the passing
down of these stories, indices are created in the form of what Saleh-Hanna (2015) calls
rememory. The following excerpt from Toni Morrison’s (1987) classic book Beloved
provides a vivid understanding of the way that rememory creates indices across and
through time:
Oh, yes. Oh yes, yes, yes. Someday you be walking down the road and you hear
something or see something going on. So clear. And you think it’s you thinking it
up. A thought picture. But no. It’s when you bump into a rememory that belongs
to somebody else. Where I was before I came here, that place is real. It’s never
going away. Even if the whole farm – every tree and grass blade dies. The picture
is still there and what’s more, if you go there – you who never was there – if you

discourse analysis of this report may offer insight into the role that language has played in constituting the
contemporary subject position of black women.
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go there and stand in the place where it was, it will happen again; it will be there
for you, waiting for you. So Denver, you can’t never go there. Never. Because
even though it’s all over – over and done with – it’s going to always be there
waiting for you. That’s how come I had to get all my children out. No matter what
(36).
In Beloved, Morrison presents ‘rememory’ as structural remembrance
transcending individual or time-segregated acts of remembrance. Reflecting on her
experiences of enslavement Sethe explains:
It’s so hard for me to believe in it [time]. Some things go. Pass on. Some things
just stay. I used to think it was my rememory…But it’s not… places are still there.
If a house burns down, it’s gone, but the place the picture of it – stays, and not
just in my rememory, but out there, in the world (36).
In rewriting our conceptions of memory into rememory Morrison invokes the
intergenerational nature of structural violence, speaking to institutional and intergenerational memory held within the bodies of enslaved Africans, European slaveholders,
settler-colonists and their descendants. When Orlando Patterson (1982) declared racial
thinking constructs race upon “the assumption of innate differences based on real or
imagined physical or other characteristics” he inspired us to consider how constructions
of difference between races produces a likeness necessitating homogeneity within racial
categories, giving rise to the stereotyping of blackness imagined by white culture (176).
That homogeneity of the stereotype is a repeating and ghosted process whereby white
rememory articulates across time the violent constructions of blackness implanted by
their slaveholding and colonizing ancestors. The power that naming has had over time to
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produce and reiterate the violent constructions of blackness created during the antebellum
and postbellum periods has overwhelmed attempts at rearticulation of black subjecthood.
While Miron and Inda recognize that the meanings created within the fissures can
never fully be controlled and will always remain in tension with the dominant meanings
that they contest, they still conclude that performativity leaves open the possibility for
alternative modalities of power even if it is “the labor of forging a future from resources
inevitably impure (Butler, 1993b, 241).” They argue, as a result of the reiterative
process, that the racial subject is open to being constituted otherwise.
Unfortunately, the role that supplementation and representation plays in the
reiterative process impacts the capacity for rearticulation of racialized performatives to
have any significant effects. This is particularly true for blacks. Recalling Derrida’s
structure of absence theory8, supplementation and representation act as markers. For
racialized performatives, these markers aren’t linguistic markers but corporeal ones. At
the site where discourse and embodiment meet, performative speech acts take on a
corporeal dimension that alters the functionality of race as a performative speech act. In
chapter five of his text, Black Skin, White Masks (1967), Frantz Fanon describes the
racial corporeal schema as the process of epidermalization that makes blackness a
marker, not just a signifier, of evil, bad, to be feared, less than, etc. It is this markedness
that attaches meaning to black bodies as factual, not perceptual. These markers have
become social inscriptions that undervalue, overdetermine, or make invisible those that
are marked by the “fact of the black body.”

8

See page 16.
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Similarly, Jennifer Eberhardt et al. (2004) examined visual and conceptual coding
and the influence of stereotypic associations. Their objective was to determine the extent
of visual associations between blackness and crime. They found that black faces
influence participants’ ability to spontaneously detect degraded images of crime relevant
objects such as guns. The study also revealed that abstract concepts, such as crime,
induce attentional biases toward black male faces. Finally, the results showed that these
processing biases may be related to the degree to which a social group member is
physically representative of the social group. For example, when officers were given no
information other than a face, race played a significant role in how judgments of
criminality were made.
That “face of crime,” according to Oliver et al. (2004) had a greater likelihood of
having more Afrocentric features. Their study examined news readers’ memories of
race-related facial features of an individual pictured in the news. Participants were
presented with a series of news stories, including one of four different versions of the
news story of interest: nonstereotyped, stereotyped/noncrime, nonviolent crime, violent
crime. Each of the four versions contained a photograph of an individual who was the
focus of the story, with the same photograph appearing across news conditions. Results
of the study showed that viewers’ responses maintained if not reinforced stereotypes of
blacks as criminal. This is partially due to the media’s contribution to the prototype of
the “black criminal” by providing viewers with a host of examples of crime and
particularly salient, violent crime, in which blacks are more likely than whites to be
portrayed as criminal (Dixon & Linz, 2000a, 2000b; Entman & Rojecki, 2000; Oliver
1994).
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Thus, the corporeal dimension is an important aspect to the functioning of
racialized performatives that voids the possibility for alternative modalities of power for
blacks, at least in the sense articulated by Miron and Inda. In fact, instead of the
possibility of transformation being found within the gaps and fissures, I contend that the
process of reiteration masks and obscures even further the constituting elements of
antiblackness, as well as, represents an illusion of agency via racial rearticulation that has
become dangerous for those identified as black via corporeality. Saidiya Hartman (1997)
argued that, “representations of [slave] agency have intensified the effects of subjugation
and dispossession in the guise of will and denied the abject and ambivalent personhood of
the captive in the facile and spurious attempt to incorporate the slave into the ethereal
realms of the normative subject through demonstrations of his content and/or autonomy
(53).” It is this attempt at incorporation via the illusion of agency in contrast with the
effects of the corporeal dimension that create what will later be discussed as the
performative double-speak. However, in order to fully capture the notion of performative
double-speak, there must first be a deeper dive into the history of blacks/blackness in the
United States.
In their work on performative speech acts and queer theory, Eve Sedgwick (2003)
concluded chapter two of Touching Feeling by stating, “Specifically, I have been
supposing that during the time of slavery, and for an uncircumscribable time after its
abolition probably extending beyond the present, the cluster of ostentatiously potent
linguistic acts that have been grouped loosely, since J. L. Austin, under the rubric of
‘‘performatives’’ must be understood continuously in relation to the exemplary instance
of [chattel] slavery.” This period of history is a necessary starting point because it
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provides the context for understanding the unique position that blacks occupy when
examining the impact and potential for rearticulation across racialized subject positions.
The next chapter will provide a theoretical foundation that tethers slavery, not as a
historical moment but an interpretive lens, to the following discourse analysis. Using
antiblackness as the theoretical framework for the discourse analysis is a critical step in
engaging contemporary strains of Black Studies, namely Afropessimism. This
dissertation is not solely an exercise in linguistic analysis but is intended to expand the
range of scholarship that attends to the role that language plays in the creation and
maintenance of the structure of antiblackness.
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CHAPTER TWO: THEORY
Black Lives Matter, Distinctly: A Theory of Antiblackness

In George Yancey’s 2003 text, Who Is White?: Latinos, Asians, and the New
Black/NonBlack Divide, he provides justification for a significant paradigmatic shift from
a white/nonwhite binary view of race in the United States to a black/nonblack binary.
Through a historical examination of nonblack assimilation into the category of white and
what Yancey calls the African American alienation thesis, he provides the foundation for
understanding the uniqueness that befalls blacks in the U. S. Yancey begins by
challenging the oft heard statement that in the near future, whites will become a
numerical racial minority within the United States. The time frame of when this
demographic shift is to take place is not at question, but instead he contends that the
parameters surrounding who is considered “white” is in constant flux. The flip side of
Yancey’s argument, in many ways the most important to this project, is the contention
that African Americans experience a degree of alienation unlike that of other racial
groups.
The transformation of nonblack minorities into the mainstream is occurring via
the capacity to assimilate and adopt the views of the dominant on issues of race
including, perceptions, social attitudes, political issues, social experiences, and social
interests. Yancey utilized Milton Gordon’s 1964 definition of assimilation to include
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structural, marital, civic and identificational. Simultaneously, Yancey posits an
“alienation thesis” which asserts that African Americans suffered from a qualitatively
different level of alienation than did the two other major racial minority groups in
American society: Latino and Asian Americans. The goal of his study was to assess
whether nonblack racial and ethnic groups can undergo the same type of assimilation as
European groups. He did this by conducting an empirical investigation, using the 19992000 Survey of American Attitudes and Friendships (LSAF), of the degree of structural,
marital, and identificational assimilation experienced by Latino, Asian, and African
Americans. While there are certainly more immigrant minority groups in the United
States, Yancey has selected these groups because they have been in this country for more
than 3 generations which provides a better analysis of assimilative practices.
On social attitudes of racialized issues, Yancey found that nonblack minorities are
at least as likely to match the attitudes of European Americans, supporting the idea of
identificational assimilation. Identificational assimilation is considered by Yancey to be
the most significant of the 4 types of assimilation to break down nonblack racial minority
identities. Additionally, the data provides evidence that there seems to be a consensus
among American racial groups that African Americans occupy the bottom social position
in society. Furthermore, the data regarding marital and residential segregation shows that
the rejection of African Americans, rather than the acceptance of European Americans, is
the best explanation of social distance in the United States. These findings provide
support for Yancey’s theory of nonblack assimilation, as well as, his “alienation thesis”—
the foundational justifications for the black/nonblack paradigmatic shift.
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Therefore, this paradigmatic binary shift to black/nonblack alters, in meaningful
ways, the analytic lens by which we examine the positionality of blacks within U.S. racial
dynamics. As Yancey stated, “these twin processes of nonblack assimilation and black
separation will move the nonblack and black minorities in opposing directions—
reinforcing the racial divide in the United States (4).” Thus, it is imperative that
antiblackness, rather than race, be used as the analytical lens by which the following
discourse analysis is to be performed. Antiblackness is a theory developed by
Afropessimists who are critical theorists that have studied philosophies like Marxism and
Psychoanalysis but contend that, independent of all other isms, a negrophobic genesis
structures all institutional and private life, domestically and globally. Negrophobia is
characterized by a fear, hatred, or extreme aversion to black people and black culture
worldwide (Brooks, 2012). Therefore, antiblackness will provide a more nuanced and
distinct understanding of the relationship between racial performatives and blackness, as
well as, offering a critical perspective necessary to determine the capacity for the
rearticulation of blackness. The rest of this chapter will provide a detailed overview of
some of the leading Afropessimist scholars and highlight their work on antiblackness in
order to set the theoretical foundation for interpreting the discourse of the Dred Scott
decision.
Conflict vs. Antagonism: a theory of power
The theory of antiblackness provides an in-depth analysis of the Master-Slave
relationship, a relationship defined by antagonisms rather than conflict. Comparative
analysis between the Jewish Holocaust, the Middle Passage, and Native Genocide
explored by Afropessimists makes clear this distinction.
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In response to scholars’

attempts to articulate the Holocaust as “unprecendented,” Frank Wilderson (2010) in his
text, Red, White and Black: Cinema and the Structure of U.S. Antagonisms, reminds
readers of the Middle Passage and Native American genocide as prior moments of a
normal pattern of “unprecedented” suffering. He extends his argument further by
contending that antiblackness is, in fact, not analogous to any other form of oppression.
Wilderson challenges philosophers like Jean-Paul Sartre (1948) and Giorgio Agamben
(1999), whose work positions the German/Jewish relation as the essential condition of
structural antagonism, by following the work of Frantz Fanon (1967) who describes the
Holocaust as “little family quarrels (115).” Fanon maintains that the difference between
the position of the Jew and that of the Black is one of appearance, a racial corporeal
schema. Being white prevents the position of the Jew from being overdetermined.
Instead, “his actions, his behavior are the final determinant (115).” In this sense, the
position of whiteness allows for the capacity of self-determination. In response to Sartre,
Fanon makes clear that “the white man is not only The Other but also the master, whether
real or imaginary (138).” The Middle Passage, on the other hand, functioned, as
described by Wilderson, as a metaphysical holocaust that “wiped out [African]
metaphysics, [African] customs and sources on which they are based (38).”
Afropessimists argue that instead of power relations based on conflict—or little family
quarrels—the power dynamics, as far as blackness is concerned, is one of an antagonistic
nature where the relationship is defined through a relation of negation. Rinaldo Walcott
(2021) describes this relationship through the use of the term black life-forms9. He argues

9

Walcott sees black life forms as having two perspectives, however. He does not contend that black life
forms exist solely in the space of social death as socially dead, but it is here that also becomes a site of lifemaking. He further elaborates that black life forms provide a means by which to see other ways of being
human.
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that “Euro-American definitions and practices of the human offer black life no conceptual
or actual space within the terrain of the human (9).” It is here that the black/nonblack
paradigmatic shift becomes significant because the way in which we have come to know
what is whiteness (the norm, humanity) is in contrast to what has been defined as
blackness. Fanon makes a case for this in chapter five, The Fact of Blackness, when he
writes, “The Jew belongs to the race of those who since the beginning of time have never
known cannibalism. What an idea, to eat one’s father! Simple enough one has only not to
be a nigger (115).” It is this relation of negation that structures the world and creates an
ontological uncertainty for blackness. This uncertainty is derived from the idea that the
corporeal schema used to define blackness is not based on essential characteristics but
due to the historico-racial schema sketched by the other. Black by itself signifies
nothing. It is an empty category that has been overdetermined by the historicity of
blackness, by a thousand details, anecdotes, stories created by forces external to blacks
themselves. In this way, blacks have become fixed, trapped, unable to articulate
themselves beyond that schema; prevented from accessing autonomy, agency; locked out
of that which defines Humanness, at least to the rest of the world. Here, Fanon makes
distinct social oppression and structural suffering where social oppression is defined by
alienation and exploitation while structural suffering is defined by accumulation and
fungibility. This is further articulated by Wilderson when he asserts that, “the violence
that turns the African into a thing is without analog because it does not simply oppress
the Black through tactile and empirical technologies of oppression, like the ‘little family
quarrels’ (38).” Attempts to conflate traditional technologies of oppression with
structural suffering is what Wilderson calls the “ruse of analogy,” which he argues,
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erroneously locates blacks in the world and mystifies and erases blackness’s grammar of
suffering defined by accumulation and fungibility.
Fungibility is to be understood as the foundational logic of the presumed ontology
of antiblackness rather than an examination of the lived experiences of blacks. Spillers
(1987) and Saidiya Hartman (1997) have maintained that the catastrophe of the
transatlantic slave trade is singular in the systemic reduction of human lives into
commodities and capital. This systemic reduction occurred through mathematical
calculations that transformed blacks into cargo. Spillers (2003) makes note of these
transformational calculations via a Captain’s ledger from a slave ship: “every man slave
is to be allowed six feet by one foot four inches for room, every woman five feet ten by
one foot four, every boy five feet by one foot two, and every girl four feet six by one foot
(214).” Slaves were abstracted into the metrics of property and capital as measurable
units of cargo. This notion of abstraction of the human body to serve the needs of the
political and libidinal economy defines the fungibility of blackness. Economically,
fungibility refers to those goods and products that are substitutable for one another.
Shannon Winnubst (2020) reasons that “to be fungible, in both its economic and legal
meanings, is to have all distinctive human characteristics and content hollowed out
(104).” In other words, all that makes one a human, an individual, is no longer
recognized. Instead, slaves were reduced to a space of objecthood and recognized solely
as cargo. Winnubst elaborates further by contending that “applying this logic of
fungibility to human bodies, expands the scope of economic ontology beyond the nonhuman and the inanimate as viable objects of exchange…Fungibility exerts an
ontological force that…renders blackness uncompromisingly exterior to the category of
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the human (105).” This understanding of blackness frames the interpretation of the Dred
Scott decision and how it functions as a performative speech act that names blacks as
fungible (the speech) by identifying blacks as property via slaveness while
simultaneously codifying this subject position within the law (the act). In this sense,
blacks have become ontologically trapped in the space of the object unable to move,
transform, be remedied or improved; unable to become human. As such, some
Afropessimists contend that this ontology of object-hood incapacitates any possibility of
black subjectivity, which would challenge Miron and Inda’s notions of rearticulation for
blacks (Wilderson, 2010; Sexton, 2008; and Warren, 2018).
The logic of fungibility meaningfully impacts how conflictual power relations and
antagonistic power relations function and are to be understood. Implied in Miron and
Inda’s postulate of race as a performative speech act is a Foucauldian theory of power
relations. While in agreeance with Foucault’s notion of discursive formation, divergence
arises in that Foucault assumes that all forms of power are normatively equivalent. He
argues that, “There cannot be relations of power unless subjects are free. If one were
completely at the disposition of the other and became his thing, an object on which he
can exercise an infinite and unlimited violence, there would not be relations of power. In
order to exercise relations of power, there must be on both sides at least a certain form of
liberty (Bernauer and Rasmussen, 1994, 12)10.” However, what is obvious here is the
lack of consideration of the position of the slave who, through the logic of fungibility,
was reduced to the status of object and endured infinite and unlimited violence.
According to Hartman (1997), “slavery is characterized by direct and simple forms of

This is a quote from an interview with Foucault that was translated by J.D. Guathier, S.J. called “The
Ethic of Care for the Self as a Practice of Freedom.”
10
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domination, the brutal asymmetry of power, the regular exercise of violence, and the
denial of liberty that make it difficult, if not impossible, to direct one’s own conduct, let
alone the conduct of others (55).” As such, the position of the Black, as slave/object, is
presupposed by three constituent elements that undergird the particular grammar of
suffering in which they experience: gratuitous violence, natal alienation, and general
dishonor (Patterson, 1982). Gratuitous violence is characterized as violence that is not
contingent—triggered by some event—but violence that is open-ended, without reason or
constraint. Hartman (1997) describes gratuitous violence as an extension of the Master’s
prerogative. Natal alienation is the lack of relational capacity, where this lack is not the
direct result of being detached from land, lineage and customs during the Middle Passage
but is articulated as an essence of blackness. Natal alienation can best be understood by
the idea that the “slave had no socially recognized existence outside of their
master…alienated from all rights or claims of birth, he ceased to belong in their own right
to any legitimate social order (Patterson, 1982, 5).” Finally, general dishonor is
understood as being considered dishonorable prior to any transgression being committed,
as “the slave had no power, no independent social existence, hence no public worth
(Patterson, 1982, 10).”
Understanding the three constituent elements of blacks’ grammar of suffering,
Foucault doesn’t just miss the mark, instead the Foucauldian theory of power contributes
to the erasure of the type of racist violence that blacks endure. In Discipline and
Punishment, Foucault ignores the corporeal schema that undergirds racist violence which
results in him analyzing policing with a focus on behavior rather than the identification of
criminality based on the fact of blackness itself. Joy James (1996) makes note of this
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when she argues, “Foucault writes of social fear and policing that are reflected in ‘binary
division and branding,’ which produces the polarized social entities of the ‘mad/sane;
dangerous/harmless; normal/abnormal’; this ‘coercive assignment’ of labeling,
categorizing, and identifying places the individual under ‘constant surveillance.’
Foucault, however, makes no mention of sexual and racial binary oppositions to
designate social inferiority and deviancy as biologically inscribed on the bodies of
nonmales or nonwhites. Therefore, when he reports in Discipline and Punish that ‘the
mechanisms of power’ are organized ‘around the abnormal individual, to brand him and
to alter him,’ racial and sexual issues are evaded (26).” It is this notion of what James
call the unspecified body that justifies and maintains the ruse of analogy while obscuring
the specificity of violence borne by blacks.
Hartman’s Paradox: From Slavery to Freedom
The question remains, how do we get from the position of the slave to
contemporary understandings of antiblack violence? What makes Dred Scott relevant
given all of the constitutional and legislative changes that have occurred since the era of
slavery? The ruse of analogy between conflict and antagonism conceals the paradox
between slavery and freedom. In her chapter, “Burdened Individuality of Freedom” in
Scenes of Subjection, Hartman begins her analysis of this paradox by examining the
relationship between slavery and freedom. Freedom, she argues, gained authority in
relation to slavery and slavery extended itself in the limitations and subjection of freedom
(115). The entanglement of slavery and freedom led to an illusion of a definitive
temporal separation of the two marked by what Hartman calls the “nonevent of
emancipation (116).” Even more than an illusion, Emancipation marked the paradox
between slavery and freedom which ultimately confounded autonomy with property. She
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continues by maintaining that questions of sovereignty, right and power were inevitably
framed via the relation of negation because dominion and domination of slavery were
fundamentally defined by black subjection. As such “emancipatory discourses of rights,
liberty and equality instigate, transmit and effect forms of racial domination while liberal
narratives of individuality idealized mechanisms of domination and discipline (116).”
Hartman’s goal was to grapple with the changes wrought in the social fabric after
the abolition of slavery. In doing so, she examined pedagogical handbooks designed to
aid freed people in the transition from slavery to freedom, the itineracy of the freed and
other “exorbitant” practices, agricultural reports concerned with the productivity of free
labor, political debate on the Reconstruction Amendments, and legal cases—which
included narratives of slavery and freedom. Hartman’s position was that the discrepant
bestowal of emancipation can be found in the discourses of historical documents that
deliberate the origins of slavery and the birth of the republic, the place of slavery in the
Constitution, the substance of citizenship and the lineaments of black freedom (116).
This is significant because it highlights the importance of examining such an old
text—the Dred Scott decision—by exposing the interconnectedness of historical
discourses on contemporary manifestations of black positionality within society. While
the Dred Scott decision happened pre-Emancipation, the paradox between slavery and
freedom hinges on, what I have identified as, the process of naming that occurred within
that document. Hartman describes the nascent individualism of emancipation as the
burdened individuality that consumes black subjectivity because legal precedents prior to
emancipation, such as Dred Scott, made blacks’ rights and black citizenship untenable, if
not impossible (117). This ultimately produced a double-speak of freedom for nonblacks
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simultaneously securing the incoherence of blackness post-Emancipation. The doublespeak framed black subjectivity via contradictory positionalities such as: free from
slavery and free of resources, emancipated and subordinated, self-possessed and
indebted, equal and inferior, liberated and encumbered, sovereign and dominated, citizen
and subject.
As mentioned above, Hartman (1997) describes the abolition of slavery as the
“nonevent of emancipation.” This research takes a step back to ask the question, how did
emancipation become a nonevent? Hartman contends that “slavery undergirded the
rhetoric of the republic and equality defined so as to sanction subordination and
segregation (116).” I argue that one of the pivotal moments in that discursive history
came with the decision—more specifically, the majority opinion—given in the Dred
Scott case. This case discursively made blackness synonymous with slaveness, thus
property and co-constitutive with personhood. While there were certainly significant
legal ramifications of this decision, the focus here is the discursive implications on
blackness. Therefore, the theory of antiblackness will be used to interpret the discursive
formation of Judge Taney’s majority opinion.
The significance of using antiblackness as a theoretical intervention is to provide
a lens through which to understand the following analysis. This analysis is not just
another example of applied research concerning performative speech acts relative to race.
Instead, it provides a reconceptualization of the manner in which performatives are
interpreted across race. Put another way, performative speech acts can have double
meaning that on the one hand enables white innocence while simultaneously performing
antiblack violence. It is at the level of doubl-speak where gratuitous violence becomes
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obscured. A discourse analysis set within the proper historical context can expose the
discursive structures used to constitute and maintain that violence.
Examples of this form of double speak can be found in various places throughout
history. One of the most prominent examples of this would be the United States
Constitution. As constitutional rights are generally understood as performative
utterances, for blacks, this is not necessarily the case because the conditions under which
the original utterances were written were not appropriate. The constitution was written
at a time where “man/men” was universally assumed to mean land owning white men.
As such, “the promise” of protected rights was granted only to the class of “men” it was
intended to serve. Thus, under the guise of this colonial history it becomes difficult to
assess the “appropriate conditions” of performative utterances universally. As such, one
of the biggest conundrums across racially designated categories in regards to
performative language is modality. There is a resulting disconnect between how
something happens versus how it is experienced, interpreted, or understood across
differential groups. The universal assumption among whites, in the contemporary, of
sameness with regards to American citizenship creates conflicting assessments of what
constitutes “appropriate conditions.” This disconnect results in a “felicitous
performative” for some and an “infelicitous performative” for others. Another example
would be for a police officer to vow to serve and protect citizens of the United States.
This performative speech act, the vow, is complicated by the latter portion “citizens of
the United States” in cases where said police officer assumes that blacks are not humans,
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thus citizens (Wynter, 201511). Unfortunately, citizenship—and humanness for that
matter—is universally assumed, not questioned. Therefore, the vow is also assumed to
be a happy functioning performative to all who assume the universality of United States
citizenship. While J.L. Austin deals with instances of mutual exclusivity in Lecture II, he
does not speak to the extremely important instances of contradiction that produce the
effect of double-speak and are inevitable outcomes within structurally antagonistic
relationships. These outcomes are inevitable because antagonistic relationships dictate
that the opposing positions are inherently in contradiction to one another. Situating this
analysis within the particular frame of antiblackness opens the possibility to further
explore the contradictory effects of performatives via double-speak, effects that are
significant to understanding black social and political life.
Additionally, it is at the level of double-speak where blackness maintains its
incoherence. It becomes impossible for nonblacks to conceive of the meaning derived
from particular discursive moments for blacks because they are differentially situated in
opposition to one another through the entanglements of discourse and history. For
blacks, double-speak makes illusory the power to choose. Double-speak creates the
situation where refusal to “reiterate” or (re)produce the Master’s text reaffirms the
pathological representations of blackness, thus producing a damned if you do, damned if
you don’t non-choice for black action. In other words, you either assimilate, without
success, or you refuse assimilation and become the example of black pathology/deviance.
Think of all the instances where blacks were killed by police while not resisting, while in

11

Wynter wrote a piece called, No Human Involved, in which she identifies the use of the acronym N.H.I.
by the Los Angeles Police Department. The acronym was routinely used in any case involving the breach
of the rights of young black males who belonged to the jobless category of the inner city ghettos.
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compliance. These are unsuccessful attempts to assimilate, to follow the moral order.
Now think of all of the instances where blacks justifiably questioned the authority of
police and were killed. The narratives following those incidents were “if they would
have just complied with the police, they would not have been killed.” These examples
are the results of the entanglements of discourse and history that must be unpacked in
order to mitigate further reiteration of those violent constructions and to highlight the
hidden functionality of discursive associations that have traversed slavery and freedom.
There are obvious drawbacks to using this theory. As noted by black feminist
scholar, Tiffany King (2016), “there has been debate within Black Studies about whether
or not theories of black fungibility are too chained to the hold of the (slave) ship and too
death bound to do any good for theorizing and more importantly living black life (1024).”
This debate is largely described by Stephen Marshall (2012) as tensions between theorists
of “social death” (Wilderson, 2010 and Sexton, 2010) versus those who theorize “social
life” (Moten, 2003 & 2008). This tension that exists between social death and social life
can partially be explained by the difficult position that black race scholars find
themselves in within academia. Ronald Judy (1993) explains, “the effect of delineating a
peculiar African American historiography seems menacing and unbearable to the lone
black scholar; and so, the black scholar labors to adjust the structure of his or her own
nonrecuperable negativity in order to tell a story of an emerging subjectivity’s triumphant
struggle to discover its identity and thereby ascend from the abject muteness of
objectivity into productive subjectivity.” Having found myself often struggle with the
tension created by the nihilistic feelings I have as a race scholar with the hope that I must
maintain in order to survive, I have concluded that it is not necessary in this instance to
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resolve that tension but to work within it12. Ultimately, I find using antiblackness as an
analytic necessary to reveal the manner in which particular discursive formations produce
this precarious position for black race scholars.
Furthermore, there are limitations to how this theory gets applied in this instance.
While there is significant and important work from Afropessimist theorists on the role
that gender and sexuality (Spillers, 1987; Hartman, 1997; King, 2016; Jackson, 2018;
Warren, 2018) play within antiblackness, the specificity of that work extends beyond the
scope of this particular project. This is also true of the relationship between
antiblackness and ability studies (Bruce, 2021). It is not the intent here to ignore their
theoretical contributions13 but instead, this work seeks to lay the framework for how to
situate those discussions in an examination of historical discourse as it relates to
antiblackness, gender, sexuality, different abilities and performative speech acts. For
example, a specific analysis of the discourse used in the Missouri v Celia, 1855 case
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While I don’t intend to resolve this tension here, I believe it is important to make clear how I understand
social life and social death. It would appear in this chapter that I take a stance in favor of social death but
that would be an inaccurate assumption. Here, I highlight antiblackness as a structural analytic only. As a
structural analytic, antiblackness is understood as the mechanism that structures black life externally.
Antiblackness becomes the mechanism by which the world relates to blackness. This however, does not
completely and fully explain how black life exists within the world. As such, I would caution scholars
from using antiblackness beyond its use as a structural analytic. I would argue that social life and social
death operate on different registers, different conceptual planes, if you will. On the one hand, antiblackness
positions and repositions blackness into a position void of historical movement. Repositions is the key
word here, because on the other hand, blackness is forever moving. Blackness finds alternate conceptual
spaces to move into in order to produce and reproduce social life. One would have to think of the
relationship between social life and social death beyond the traditional confines of linear progression in
order to understand the value in social life as it relates to social death. Therefore, working within the
tension between social life and social death means that I find energy in the spaces of social life in order to
continue the work of exposing the mechanics that produce the zones of social death.
13
The theoretical importance of the work on antiblackness, gender, sexuality and ability studies is critically
important because it becomes easy to flatten blackness and to conclude that all people that exist as part of
the category of blackness are impacted in the same way, which often leads to intracommunal violence. The
tendency towards the flattening of blackness misses the important textures that exist within blackness and
lead to the reification of antiblack structural positions. Sexism, homophobia, transphobia and ableism
within black communities occur because we so often take up the narratives of antiblackness in our attempts
reiterate a “clean and pure” version of blackness, a version that is not real nor is it a possibility.
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could provide meaningful contributions to the scholarship on gender, discourse, and
antiblackness. Additionally, there exists an interplay between antiblackness and settler
colonialism that is not explored in great depth in this work14.
One of the difficulties in operationalizing this theory is the leap from the
discursive analysis of a historical text to the implications that it has on the contemporary
moment. However, it is the presumed temporal and spacial distance that conceals the
structural cohesion from slavery to now15. It is imperative that we, as academics, find all
of the ways to connect those dots if we ever hope to alter structural antiblackness in any
significant way. This dissertation attempts to bridge the gap between Linguistic Studies
and Black Studies, particularly Afropessimism, in order to uncover a rhetorical moment
in discursive history that coheres slavery to the modern world.
Finally, there is the inability to universalize the conclusions of this analysis across
racial categories. However, this is the point. The attempts to universalize often obscure
vital findings within the particular. It is not the goal of this research to provide a
framework for “people of color” as it relates to the discussion of race and performative
speech acts. Instead, this research seeks to unearth discursive practices that continuously
allows violence to position and reposition blacks, preventing historical movement.

14

Wilderson (2010) explores this relationship in greater detail in Red, White & Black. Also see Tiffany
King’s (2016) work on Plantation Landscapes.
15
See the work by John Murillo III (2016) Quantum Blackanics: Untimely Blackness and Black Literature
out of Nowhere for a more thorough reading on the relationship between antiblackness, time and space
from the perspective of theoretical physics.
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CHAPTER THREE: METHODS
A Discourse Analysis

Scott v. Emerson (1852)
Prior to explaining the methodological steps taken in order to conduct the
discourse analysis, it is important to provide a synopsis of the Dred Scott case itself. The
initial petition to request permission to bring suit against Irene Emerson in order to
establish the right to freedom for Scott and his wife Harriett was filed on April 6, 1846 in
the circuit court of St. Louis. This petition summarized the circumstances of their
residence on free soil. The petition was granted and on the same day the Scott’s filed
separate declarations initiating actions of trespass for assault and false imprisonment.
However, prior to determining the outcome of the suits filed by the Scotts, the validity of
their claims of free personhood had to be determined. If it was decided that they were
slaves, the alleged actions of the defendant would be considered legal rights of the
slaveowner. If they were indeed free persons, then the alleged actions would be
considered a crime.
On June 30, 1847, the jury decided in favor of the defendant, Mrs. Emerson.
However, the courts granted the Scott’s motion for a new trial which did not begin until
January 12, 1850. This time, the court ruled in favor of the Scotts16, making them
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The precedent for this decision was Rachel v Walker, 1836.
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nominally free. Mrs. Emerson was then granted a new trial at the state supreme court and
briefs were filed in March of 1850. Unfortunately, on March 22, 1852 amidst the
sectional tension over the institution of slavery, the Missouri Supreme Court reversed the
decision of the lower courts determining that the Scott’s were still legal slaves and that
they should have sued for their freedom while they lived in the free state.
In 1853, Dred Scott acquired new legal counsel and began a new suit for freedom
in a federal circuit court after allegedly being sold to Emerson’s brother, John Sandford.
The new suit was filed under the diverse citizenship clause. Sandford sought dismissal of
the case on the grounds of legal ownership of the Scotts. A judge upheld that Scott was
indeed a citizen of Missouri as defined based on residence and legal capacity to own
property. The judge did not, however, rule on the question of whether or not free blacks
were considered citizens (Fehrenbacher, 1981)17. On May 15, 1854 the case went to trial
and the jury returned a verdict in favor of Sandford. Scott’s attorney filed an appeal to
the Supreme Court and the record for Scott v. Sandford reached the Supreme Court on
December 30, 1854.
Scott v. Sandford (1857)
Argument before the U.S. Supreme Court in Scott v. Sandford began on February
11, 1856. Scott’s attorney, Montgomery Blair, filed a brief that argued for Scott’s
freedom and defended Negroes’ right to sue in court on the grounds of citizenship. The
defense put forth a case that argued that Negroes were, in fact, not citizens and forwarded
an attack on the constitutionality of the Missouri Compromise restriction. The Court was
divided on the question of the Negro right to sue and whether or not the court had the
17

Judge Robert Wells chose only to interpret the diverse-citizenship clause in Article Three, Section Two
of the Constitution.
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authority to review such an issue. As such, the Court ordered the case to be reargued in
order to address these two questions. Re-argument began on December 15, 1856
following the highly controversial election of Democratic President James Buchanan.
Blair focused his arguments on the question of citizenship while the defense focused their
arguments on the question of jurisdiction. This line of argumentation made it the first
time that the constitutionality of the Missouri Compromise came before the Supreme
Court. The decision handed down by the Supreme Court of the United States in the Dred
Scott v. Sandford case on March 6, 1857 ultimately concluded that: the Supreme Court
had jurisdiction to review the case, Negroes were not citizens of the United States, Scott
was a slave, the Missouri Compromise was unconstitutional, Missouri had the authority
under the doctrine of reversion to uphold Scott’s status as a slave upon his return to
Missouri from Illinois, and the circuit court of Missouri must dismiss the case on the
grounds of jurisdiction.
Each of these decisions was not arrived at in a vacuum. There were significant
political debates that were occurring that influenced the progression of the Dred Scott
case over time. Additionally, the people involved in the case such as lawyers, judges,
political appointees, etc. were in constant flux. All of this mattered in determining what
was deemed central to the case and important factors in how the case would proceed.
According to Don Fehrenbacher (1981), there were three principal issues that Judge
Roger Taney dealt with in his final written opinion: 1) the black race generally and free
blacks in particular (citizenship); 2) the institution of slavery; and 3) the territorial
system. Therefore, it is imperative to put the text of the majority opinion in conversation
with archival documents that explore these three particular issues. The specific
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documents referenced in the majority opinion include: the slave trade clause, the
commerce clause, the privileges and immunities clause, the fugitive slave clause (thus the
Fugitive Slave Act), the property/territory clause and the provision for admission of new
states18. Additionally, and perhaps the most significant influence in the Dred Scott
decision was the dispute over the constitutionality of the Missouri Compromise. Each of
these texts and their supporting historical documents provide context for some of the
significant constitutional debates that informed the Court’s decision in the Scott case.
The Significance
In order to investigate the hypothesis that the majority opinion in the Dred Scott v
Sandford case is an antiblack performative speech act, it is important to recall the three
foundational elements of a performative speech act theorized by Miron and Inda. The
first is the process of naming. Analyzing the United States Supreme Court majority
opinion written by Chief Justice Roger B. Taney in the case of Dred Scott v. Sandford,
1857 as the primary text requires the identification of the descriptive names used to
define blackness, in general, and the Scotts in particular. As Foucault (1972) argued, in
order to understand a particular subject position, their naming and the meanings attached
to those names must be traced back through history.
The second and third elements of a performative speech act are the process of
iteration and the force of authority. Both of these elements are inherently present via the
nature and role of the United States Supreme Court. The Supreme Court website
articulates the role of the Court as “the final arbiter of the law, charged with ensuring the
American people the promise of equal justice under the law and, thereby, also functions
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Articles I and IV of the Constitution.
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as guardian and interpreter of the Constitution (supremecourt.gov, 2021).” Linguistic
scrutiny is intrinsic to the process of interpretation. The legal determinations, or
opinions, of the Supreme Court rely on arguments presented, definitions presented within
those arguments, and several layers of interpretation of the language of the laws and
procedures. The very nature of the term "opinion" indicates the force of authority that
language holds within the law. As such, a discourse analysis that examines the language
of the Dred Scott decision is important to understanding the long-term implications set by
the decision. The subjective nature of interpretation and the force of authority granted
the Supreme Court renders an analysis of this kind significant. Understanding the
implications of the precedents set, particularly regarding blacks in the United States, by
the Supreme Court is important to provide clarity to the contemporary moment that we
find ourselves in. The Dred Scott decision was one of the last precedents set regarding
the status of blacks in the United States prior to the abolition of slavery, making it
integral to the paradox between slavery and freedom that Hartman (1997) describes in
Scenes of Subjection.
Additionally, these precedents set by the opinion of the Supreme Court provide the
basis for iteration to occur over time. Cornell Law (2020) defines precedent as, referring
to a court decision that is considered as authority for deciding subsequent cases involving
identical or similar facts, or similar legal issues. Precedent is incorporated into the
doctrine of stare decisis19 and requires courts to apply the law in the same manner to
cases with the same facts, creating an on-going point of iteration over time. Furthermore,
given the force of authority of the Supreme court, precedent extends beyond the legal
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Stare decisis is Latin for “to stand by things decided.”
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frame of reference and often gets taken up by society in everyday debate and discussion.
It is the extralegal ramifications of Supreme Court decisions that endure long after those
decisions have been overturned. Thus, in spite of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the
13th, 14th, and 15th Amendments, Judge Taney’s words still have the possibility of
carrying the force of authority well into the 21st century via the process of iteration as
taken up by society. Although words and definitions may change over time, the function
of the majority opinion has the power to sustain itself through discursive iteration.
The significance in identifying the Dredd Scott decision as a performative speech
act is tied to the theory of antiblackness via black accumulation and fungibility.
Unfortunately, instances of black fungibility become obscured through what Wilderson
(2010) argues is the ruse of analogy. He argues that, the manner in which blacks become
accumulated within antiblackness is through “the erroneous location of blacks in the
world while mystifying and erasing black suffering (37).” Therefore, the analysis will
attempt to unmask that ruse by identifying the specific occurrences within the Dred Scott
decision by which the Scotts are humanized versus occurrences by which the Scotts are
reduced to objecthood in steps one and three of the analysis.
However, categorizing the Scotts into human and object are only the first steps
towards understanding the nature of fungibility within the Dred Scott decision. Chapter
three identified three premises for identifying black fungibility. The first is the
systematic reduction of human lives into commodities/capital, reducing blacks to an
object of exchange (Spillers, 1987; Hartman, 1997). The second is the use of abstraction
to serve the needs of the political economy (Spillers, 1987). Winnubst (2020) offered the
third and final premise as, having all distinctive characteristics and content hollowed out,

50

shifting an individual’s status to one that is categorically nonhuman. In order to
accomplish this, it is necessary to explore the ways that language as a political tool has
the power to constitute particular subject positions for political gain. Therefore, the third
step of the analysis will interpret the interaction of black subject constitution in
conversation with the political context that surrounded the case.
James Paul Gee (2014) states that, “in language, there are important connections
among saying (informing), doing (action), and being (identity) (2).”—A large portion of
the literature on race and language articulate “being” as identity based, even while
recognizing that is not all that there is to being. Pulling identity out and using it as the
variable of study misses a lot of nuanced analysis that is important to understanding why
particular identity choices are made at any given moment. For example, blacks don’t just
choose to code switch because identity shifts are inevitable and necessary. Often times
(more times than not) code switching for blacks can be the difference between life and
death. Therefore, my research seeks to expand the scope of being to include the impact
of structural positioning on the manner in which blacks choose to move through the
world via their perceived ontological relationship(s) to the world. There are two major
reasons for this expansion of scope. First, perceived ontologies20 underscores how people
think about themselves during the process of identity construction. Second, perceived
ontologies—specifically perceived black ontologies—has a complex history that has real
material implications on how blacks understand and navigate their position in the United

I use “perceived ontologies” because first, there is no singular ontology (see my discussion on ontology
in the Concluding Thoughts chapter of this dissertation). Additionally, I say perceived because there is
what we think our relationship is to the world based on our experiences and interactions and there is how
the world sees us. Reality exists somewhere in between, a combination of those two forces. Lastly, there is
often a disconnect between our conscious and subconscious thoughts about who we are and who we project
ourselves to be.
20
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States that is not limited to identity alone, be it political or social. Equally important is
that using identity as a determining variable in research obscures the manner and extent
to which subject positions are created externally and the implications this has on
determining one’s being. This makes the third step of the analysis crucial to coming to
terms with the long-term impact of the Dred Scott decision. More specifically, this
portion of the analysis may help to clarify the complexities inherent within the structural
antagonism that undergirds our current political system.
The Method
There were three steps in conducting the following discourse analysis. The first
step of the analysis was to identify the use of identity markers and their corresponding
descriptors. These identity markers were compared/contrasted and analyzed to get a
better sense of how these various identities were enacted within the text and how they
were depicted independently, as well as, in relation to one another.
The second step identified the use of universal terms and phrases within the text of
the majority opinion. These universal terms and phrases were then analyzed to
determine the capacity for blacks to assimilate via an inclusion/exclusion framework.
This step was integral to assessing the efficacy of the black/nonblack paradigm posited
within Yancey’s African American Alienation Thesis. The black/nonblack paradigm
shifts the analytic lens by which we examine the positionality of blacks within U.S. racial
dynamics and undergirds the theory of antiblackness that provided the foundation for step
three.
The third and final step was to identify the moments of antiblackness as determined
by the tenets of accumulation and fungibility. To accumulate, according to MerriamWebster Dictionary (2021) means, to gather or pile up especially little by little.
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Therefore, this section of the analysis will look for portions of the text that collapse
blackness into a singular category. Additionally, the examination of fungibility was
guided by the three premises for identifying acts of fungibility as a means for analyzing
and assessing the relationship of blacks to the issues of citizenship, the institution of
slavery and the territorial system. The first premise, the systematic reduction of human
lives into commodities, was measured in two ways: 1) the instances where blacks were
identified explicitly as property and 2) the instances where blacks or the Scotts were
discussed in any way related to ownership. The second premise, the use of abstraction to
serve the needs of the political economy, was interpreted by examining the cases where
blacks or the Scotts were discussed in relation to the financial economy, in general, and
the Missouri Compromise, specifically. The third premise, having all distinctive human
characteristics hollowed out, was interpreted by identifying all of the cases where blacks
or the Scotts were categorically denied human characteristics, directly or indirectly.
The Limitations
Despite the desire to be as thorough as possible, limitations in research are
inevitable. The very nature of conducting an analysis on a decision from 1857 comes
with unavoidable constraints such as the fact that some of the court records in the Dred
Scott case have been destroyed or have disappeared. As such, certain context
surrounding the case remains obscure. This however, does not diminish the significance
of the analysis as the performative speech act can be assessed using the official written
decision which has been done here. Additionally, features of discourse extend beyond
the scope of what the written word can capture. Therefore, the analysis of static text
excludes important extralinguistic features that could prove or disprove some of the
conclusions derived at during the analysis. Examples of the extralinguistic features could
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include emphasis on words or phrases, expressions, gestures, movements, etc. Next,
comparison between the official written decision and the oral decision could provide
more context for interpretation. The literature has indicated that there could have been
substantial changes to the majority opinion from the time of its oral delivery to the
submission of the official written opinion (Fehrenbacher, 1981). Unfortunately, there is
no transcript of the oral opinion by which to engage a comparative analysis. The last
limitation mentioned above concerns potential questions that could arise regarding the
potential effects that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the 13th-15th Amendments have had
on the long-term implications of the Dred Scott decision. Admittedly, it is difficult to
attribute Judge Taney’s speech act to instances of antiblackness in the contemporary
without doing a comparative analysis across each of these texts. While it has been argued
that Congress ignored Taney’s ruling on the power of Congress to regulate slavery in the
territories, a comparative analysis could offer insight into the legal force of authority
granted to Taney’s words over time. However, this level of analysis is beyond the scope
of this particular project. What remains important, however, is the significance of the
role that naming plays in the Dred Scott decision and that is within the scope of this
particular analysis. Recalling Derrida’s theory of iteration, performatives only have to
have the capacity to be iterable. In that regard, even if legislative acts overturned the
Court’s decision in Dred Scott, the majority opinion maintains discursive power that
exceeds the legal ramifications.
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CHAPTER FOUR: RESULTS
Black is Slave
The analysis in this dissertation was conducted in three major parts. The first
objective was to determine if the majority opinion text could be described as a
performative speech act through the process of naming. This was achieved by identifying
the identity markers and descriptors within the text. Secondly, an examination of the use
of universal terms and phrases was conducted to establish whether the text provided any
data in support of or counter to George Yancey’s African American alienation thesis.
Universal terms and phrases were used as a measure for the assimilative capacity of
blacks via an inclusion/exclusion framework. The last aim was to determine if the
language within the majority opinion could be interpreted as acts of antiblackness by
identifying moments of accumulation and fungibility as defined in the previous theory
chapter, as well as determining if the power relations were conflictual—"little family
quarrels”—or antagonistic via a relation of negation.
Discursive Representation and the Process of Naming
Given the Constitution said very little about the content of citizenship (Chambers,
2011), the manner in which citizenship was defined in the Dred Scott case makes this
case a defining moment in history for black subject constitution, at least in the United
States. Citizenship was defined through the discursive use of identity markers in the first
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section of the majority opinion.

Therefore, it is necessary to identify those identity

markers and analyze the context of their use. Figure 1 provides a list of each identity
marker along with the descriptors associated with each identity.
Figure 1: Identity Markers and Descriptors
Identity Marker
African

Slave
Citizen

Negro/Black

Alien
European/English
White
Master
Inhabitant

Descriptors
Class of persons, an unfortunate race, imported, subordinate, inferior
class of beings, subjugated, emancipated or not, unfit, article of
property, enslaved, non-citizens
African, negro, Black, laborers, article of property, property of the
master, non-citizens
Member of the political community, people of the United States,
political body, sovereign, power holders, conductors of government,
constituents, political family, members of the several state
communities upon adoption of the Constitution, distinguished, great
men, high in literary acquirements, high in their sense of honor,
incapable of inconsistency between word and action,
African, ordinary article of merchandise and traffic, article of
property, excluded from civilized government and the family of
nations, doomed to slavery, unhappy, separated from white race by
indelible marks, a separate class of persons, not “the people,” noncitizens
Non-citizen yet specifically undefined
Civilized, enlightened, human, equal, endowed by God
A race, European, part of the civilized/enlightened portions of the
world, men
Owner, trader, citizen
Non-citizens in the territories yet specifically undefined

Within the text, nine21 identity markers were found. Of those nine, four are racial
or ethnic identifiers. The other five indicate status identity markers, where status is
defined as a position or rank in relation to others (Merriam-Webster Dictionary Online,
2021). There are two unique outliers regarding identity markers that are not specifically

21

Black was only used once and it was used interchangeably with negro. Therefore, they are counted
together as one of the nine total identity markers. The same is true for European/English.
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defined as part of the other seven categories. The first is the identity marker “alien.”
Alien was used twice:
Each State may still confer them upon an alien, or any one it
thinks proper, or upon any class or description of persons; yet he would not
be a citizen in the sense in which that word is used in the Constitution of the United
States, nor entitled to sue as such in one of its courts, nor to the privileges
and immunities of a citizen in the other States (U.S. Constitution: A Reader, 2012,
p. 486-487).
Consequently, no State, since the adoption of the Constitution, can, by
naturalizing an alien, invest him with the rights and privileges secured to a citizen
of a State under the federal government, although, so far as the State alone was
concerned, he would undoubtedly be entitled to the rights of a citizen, and
clothed with all the rights and immunities which the Constitution and laws of
the State attached to that character (U.S. Constitution: A Reader, 2012, p.487).
The second outlier is “inhabitants” which appeared four times within the text, all in
reference to the governance of territories:
But until that time arrives, it is undoubtedly necessary that some government
should be established, in order to organize society, and to protect the inhabitants
in their persons and property…(U.S. Constitution: A Reader, 2012, p. 497)
It was their duty to establish the one that would be best suited for the protection
and security of the citizens of the United States and other inhabitants who
might be authorized to take up their abode there, and that must always depend
upon the existing condition of the Territory, as to the number and character of
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its inhabitants, and the situation in the Territory. In some cases a government,
consisting of persons appointed by the Federal Government, would best subserve
the interests of the Territory, when the inhabitants were few and scattered, and
new to one another (p. 497).
Recalling Foucault’s (1972) discussion of representation, he argued that subjects
are “constituted by all that was said, in all the statements that named it, divided it up,
described it, explained it, traced its development, indicated its various correlations,
judged it, and possibly gave it speech by articulating, in its name, discourses that were to
be taken as its own (32).” Therefore, it is important to note the use of slave(s) in contrast
to enslaved. Slave(s), as a noun, was used a total of 29 times, while enslaved was only
used once. As a noun, slave(s) represent an identity category—the naming of a subject—
rather than the description of a subject’s circumstance, as written to describe the
condition of the African race:
“But it is too clear for dispute, that the enslaved African race were
not intended to be included, and formed no part of the people who framed and
adopted this Declaration; (U.S. Constitution: A Reader, 2012, p.489)”
Representation can also occur via presupposition according to Derrida’s Structure
of Absence theory as is the case for the use of the phrase “indelible marks.” Chief Justice
Taney used this phrase to position blacks external to the human family. In his use of the
phrase, I expected to see actual descriptors of the “indelible marks” that separated the
“unhappy black race” from “the white” but that doesn’t happen within the text.
Nevertheless, based on Derrida’s (1972) Structure of Absence Theory which states that
performatives can successfully function despite the fact that certain utterances or aspects
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of utterances are not present, it is still possible for the majority opinion to successfully
function as a performative speech act without those specific descriptors being present.
The descriptors of the indelible marks referenced are presumed as common knowledge
based on the racial corporeal schema that had been previously developed, described,
defined and attached to slaveness.
Lastly, discourse operates to constitute racial subjects through its material
embodiment within institutions (Miron and Inda, 2000). Chief Justice Taney led one of
the most authoritative institutions within the United States. The act of presenting the
majority opinion can be understood as a material embodiment of the decision arrived at in
the Dred Scott case. The discursive choices Taney made to appeal to universals would
further cement the idea that the majority opinion was an institutional representation, not
the individual choices of each Supreme Court Justice. Taney’s use of “we” to refer to the
Justices would imply that the entire court was in agreement despite the 7-2 vote. There
was no mention of the two dissenters, McClean and Curtis, nor their arguments in
opposition to the majority opinion. It is this force of authority that codified the position
of blackness within the law. Even though the Constitution granted Congress the authority
to decide who can become a citizen of the United States, the federal courts have
jurisdiction when citizen-parties are from different states. Therefore, the force of
authority laid solely in the hands of the Taney Court on matters of citizenship, slavery
and ultimately black subject constitution.
The question remains, does the use of identity markers alone constitute a performative
speech act? The answer is no. However, situating the use of those identity markers within
the larger discursive framework provides the context of use that would be necessary for
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interpreting the particular action performed through the use of identity markers. When
examined in the context of a theory of antiblackness, the enactment of these identity
markers can be understood anew. The next two sections will break down the language in
use as a means of interpreting the nature and extent of black alienation, accumulation and
fungibility.
African American Alienation Thesis
There are three major universal terms and phrases that are specifically defined in the
section of the majority opinion where citizenship is discussed. Those terms/phrases are
then presumed throughout the rest of the text using the we/they dichotomy. Those three
terms/phrases are: we/they, the people, and public (opinion). Figure 2 situates each
term/phrase with the corresponding groupings extracted from the text. One grouping
represents those included in the majority, while the other grouping represents those
excluded from the majority. While the we/they dichotomy flips who represents the “we”
and who represents the “they” at any given point, the contrast between the categories
remains the same throughout where blackness is excluded from the majority.
Figure 2: Universal Terms and Phrases used by Justice Taney
Universal Terms
and Phrases
We/They

Included Group(s)

Excluded Group(s)

We/They

Framers of the
Constitution, citizens at the
time the Constitution was
adopted, members of the
several state communities,
political communities, and
political family
white race

We/They

English people

That class of persons
only whose ancestors
were negroes of the
African race, imported
into this country, and
sold and held as slaves
and their descendants
beings of an inferior
order
Africans
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We/They

Human

The People

Citizens

Public (opinion)

Civilized, enlightened
portions of the world

unhappy black race
separated by indelible
marks
slaves, their
descendants-free or not
“that unfortunate race”

The phrase “public (opinion)” is specifically used only twice but is presumed in
five other instances:
1. “…that the negro might justly and lawfully be reduced to slavery for his
benefit…This opinion was at the time fixed and universal in the civilized
portion of the white race. It was regarded as an axiom in morals as well as in
politics, which no one thought of disputing…(U.S. Constitution: A Reader,
2012, p. 488-489).”
2. “The opinion thus entertained and acted upon in England was naturally
impressed upon the colonies they founded on this side of the Atlantic (p.
489).”
3. “But no one seems to have doubted the correctness of the prevailing opinion
of the time (p. 489).”
4. “But it is too clear for dispute, that the enslaved African race were not
intended to be included [in the whole human family]…(U.S. Constitution: A
Reader, 2012, p. 489).”
5. “They [framers of the Declaration of Independence] spoke and acted
according to the then established doctrines and principles, and in the ordinary
language of the day, and no one misunderstood them (U.S. Constitution: A
Reader, 2012, p.490).”
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Additionally, Justice Taney uses universal terms and phrases such as, “common consent”
and “naturalization” to ensure that people understand these words to be not of his own
but the socially agreed upon understandings and essential (natural) way things are. This
use of discourse to procure a naturalized effect (Derrida, 1972) is necessary for the
iteration process but also is integral to explain away things like residential segregation as
an effect of blacks just naturally grouping together (Bonilla-Silva, 2014). Common
consent also constitutes and maintains societal norms. Blacks are excluded from the
category of those whose consent is considered when setting those societal norms. This is,
at least, partially indicated by the use of “indelible marks” as an indicator of black
exclusion from “God’s human family,” as mentioned in the previous section.
Lastly, other nonwhite racially designated groups were not grouped with
blacks/slaves indicated by the explicit statement that “the court must be understood as
speaking in this opinion of that class only [whose ancestors were negroes of the African
race].” Instead, the space for future inclusion remained a possibility for them to be
considered citizens beyond the scope of this decision while simultaneously closing off
that possibility for ALL blacks.
The discursive use of universal terms and phrases used throughout the text indicate an
exclusion of blacks from citizenship. The wording of the text makes explicit black
exclusion while simultaneously leaving open the possibility for inclusion of other groups.
As Fanon (1967) noted, in order to be considered for citizenship “one has only not to be a
nigger (115).” Secondarily, the majority of the identity markers used are in the section
discussing citizenship status. However, once it had been determined that The Scotts—
and ultimately all blacks—where not considered citizens, black was thus reduced to the
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identity category of property throughout the remaining two-thirds of the text. From that
point forward, unless otherwise specifically defined, property/citizen become implied
categories synonymous to black/nonblack. In combination, these two discursive moves
lay the foundation for the African American Alienation thesis to become operationalized.
Antiblackness via Accumulation and Fungibility
The African American Alienation thesis has been operationalized through the relation
of negation. The relation of negation can be interpreted through an examination of the
section of the text that lays out the boundaries for one to be considered a citizen of the
United States. A portion of this section describes the history surrounding the writing of
the Declaration of Independence in which blacks where rhetorically separated from the rest
of the world in a couple of ways. The first was the distinction between the civilized and
enlightened world in contrast to the “unfortunate race” of blacks. The second was the
exclusion—via their indelible marks—of blacks from “the whole human family,” who
were naturally endowed by God to assume “the powers of the earth.” Since the marks
where only defined as characteristic of the black race, that set the standard by which the
relation of negation should be understood.
As such, the power relations established within the text cannot be considered
conflictual. In chapter 3, conflictual power relations are described by Fanon as “little
family quarrels.” However, the text makes clear in multiple instances (see Figure 3) that
blacks do not belong to the “family” that constituted the United States citizenry. Figure 3
shows that there were seven total references to the word “family.” Two of those uses
were in reference to Dred Scott’s family but the other five instances speak to the
exclusion of blacks from the political, national, and human family. Conversely, the
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standard created via the relation of negation formed an antagonistic power dynamic
between blacks and the United States government and its citizenship. This power
dynamic was constituted by the Master-Slave relationship, as slave was the position that
all blacks were reduced to within the text through acts of accumulation and fungibility,
which will be examined next.
Figure 3: Familial Exclusions
Family Reference
Political family

Source Location
p. 487, para. 15

Political family

p. 487-88, para. 5

Family of independent nations

p. 488, para. 15-20
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Exclusion Reference
It (any State) cannot make
him a member of this
community by making him
a member of its own…it
cannot introduce any
person, or description of
persons, who were not
intended to be embraced in
this new political
family…but were intended
to be excluded from it.
And the personal rights and
privileges guaranteed to
citizens of this new
sovereignty were intended
to embrace those only who
were members of the
several state communities,
or who should afterwards,
by birthright or otherwise,
become members
according to the provisions
of the Constitution…It was
the union of those who
were at the time members
of distinct and separate
political communities into
one political family…
It becomes necessary,
therefore, to determine who
were citizens of the several
States when the
Constitution was adopted.

The whole human family

p. 489, para. 35

Family of nations

p. 490, paras. 10-15
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And in order to do this, we
must recur to the
governments and
institutions of the thirteen
Colonies, when they
separated from Great
Britain and formed new
sovereignties, and took
their places in the family of
independent
nations…neither the class
of persons who had been
imported as slaves, nor
their descendants, whether
they had become free or not
were then acknowledged as
a part of the people, nor
intended to be included…
The general words above
quoted would seem to
embrace the whole human
family, and if they were
used in a similar instrument
at this day, would be so
understood. But it is too
clear for dispute that the
enslaved African race were
not intended to be included,
and formed no part of the
people who framed and
adopted this Declaration…
They (framers of the
Declaration of
Independence) perfectly
understood the meaning of
the language they used, and
how it would be understood
by others; and they knew
that it would not, in any
part of the civilized world,
be supposed to embrace the
negro race, which, by
common consent, had been
excluded from civilized
governments and the family

Family

p.492, para. 15

Family

p. 500, para. 25

of nations, and doomed to
slavery.
Was he (Dred Scott)
together with his family…
And that neither Dred Scott
himself, nor any of his
family…

In order for blackness to become the static standard of demarcation for the
relation of negation, all forms of blackness must be understood to be the same. This
continual repositioning of blackness into a universal static category occurs through the
process of accumulation. Throughout the text of the majority opinion, blackness is
accumulated in a number of ways. First, the use of “class of persons” collapsed
blackness into a singular category. Second, is the collapsing of the distinct categories of
black, negro and African; as well as, emancipated and slave into one singular category—
slave. Third, is the inclusion of descendants with the simultaneous exclusion of
birthrights. This rhetorical act prevented blacks from accessing a loophole into the
human family by permanently attaching all blacks to the status of slave.
As slaves, blacks became commodities of exchange—property—rendered
fungible. In chapter two, fungibility was defined in three ways; the hollowing out of
human characteristics (Winnubst); the systemic reduction of human lives into
commodities and capital (Hartman); and the abstraction of the human body to serve the
needs of the political economy (Spillers). There are instances of each of these within the
text. On page 489, the Scotts were explicitly excluded from the “whole human family.”
In essence, the Scotts’ human characteristics were voided. They were also referred to as
being “an inferior class of beings (U.S. Constitution: A Reader, 2012, p. 486), article of
property (U.S. Constitution: A Reader, 2012, p.489), and article of merchandise (U.S.
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Constitution: A Reader, 2012, p. 488, p. 500).” There is fluctuation in the use of people,
persons, and slaves to describe blacks in the beginning of the text. However, the point at
which it is determined that the Scotts are solely to be understood as slaves, thus property;
people and persons were not used to refer to blacks for the remainder of the text. This
makes clear the relationship between citizens and human which distinctly excludes slaves
and property.
Lastly, the first section of the majority opinion written by Taney sets out to
answer the question of whether “a negro whose ancestors were imported into this country
and sold as slaves, [can] become a member of the political community formed and
brought into existence by the Constitution of the United States, and as such become
entitled to all the rights, and privileges, and immunities, guaranteed by that instrument to
the citizen?” Taney goes on to state, “…that the plea applies to that class of persons only
whose ancestors were negroes of the African race, and imported into this country, and
sold and held as slaves (485).” The combination of this linguistic maneuver serves to
expand the scope of the decision from only evaluating the status of the Scotts to
determining the status of the entire “class of persons” defined above, ultimately rendering
the Scotts as fungible place-holders for all blacks, to be read as slaves, thus property.
Viewed in this manner, it becomes easier to understand the relationship between the
outcome of this case about freedom and the constitutionality of the Missouri
Compromise. Positioning the Scotts as property made this case a precedent-setting case
on interstate commerce and property rights. Additionally, in order to justify the
application of property rights in this case, the Scotts had to first be determined to not
count as persons. Otherwise, there would have been irreconcilable conflict between the
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rights of property and the rights of persons. As such, the Scotts had to be rendered
fungible objects in order to obscure the tautological nature of the Court’s decision.
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
The Things They Did with Words
Often people focus on the line of the Dred Scott decision that states, “…they (the
class of persons imported as slaves and their descendants) had no rights to which the
white man was bound to respect22” as one of the most important aspects of Justice
Taney’s majority opinion. While this is certainly another indicator of the stripping of
black humanity, Taney’s written opinion did much more. This decision, in fact, laid the
foundation for what blacks would become moving beyond emancipation. The Scott
decision set in motion the Paradox of which Hartman speaks. By flattening blackness
through language, Taney created an easy standard for the relation of negation. No longer
were there free blacks, slaves, emancipated blacks, etc. There were just blacks. The
collapsing of the categories of blackness into one made clear the line of demarcation for
the black/nonblack binary. This binary has since been used to structurally position the
world based on proximity to blackness; whereas, one has only not to be black.
It is important to acknowledge that the inner workings of the Dred Scott decision and
its relationship to slavery is a complicated one. However, it should be made clear that
whatever complexities exist, they cannot be used to ignore the role that slavery had in
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The past tense is used here because Taney is interpreting the Declaration of Independence via his
articulation of the historical context that existed within the “civilized and enlightened” parts of the world.
An opinion which he argued was fixed, universal, and in line with the opinion of the founding fathers who
drafted the Declaration of Independence on the question of whether slaves/their descendants were ever
intended to be included in the citizenry of the United States.
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each of the considerations within the case itself—from the question of citizenship to the
constitutionality of the Missouri Compromise. Furthermore, the intent of the arguments
made in justifying the decision are not the point here. What is significant is the paradox
which was created that has perduring implications. The paradox has created a loophole
that has been used to prevent real substantive change, through policy, for over a century.
It has created a permanent space for antiblackness to thrive obscurely. A space in which
the most well-intentioned people continue to justify the most intentional acts of
oppression and violence only because they are mystified by that very paradox that was
created so many years ago.
Now this paradox is ravaging this country across lines of demarcation regarding the
COVID pandemic. The paradox created the illusion of meritocracy, individualism and
choice, for white people and justified distrust of the government for black people and
both of those foundational logics have created a moment that the decision to get the
vaccine, for a lot of people, is understood in these terms—rightly or wrongly. The
paradox made the Southern Strategy used by President Nixon effective and cemented its
use over time. It created an ethics that allowed for armed white protestors to be described
as “very good people” whose anger was justified while condemning black anger as
“thug” behavior. The paradox created the world of “racists without racism” through the
use of colorblind rhetoric that produces the illusion of neutrality while structurally
damning the black masses to the effects of the afterlife of slavery. The paradox laid the
foundation for the language of pathology that over codes black neighborhoods as lacking
morals and ethics, ultimately justifying the continual killing of unarmed black people.
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Unfortunately, it is difficult to untangle this complex web because everyone has
become structurally positioned through the violence of language. It is imperative that
future research endeavors seek to study the relationship between language and structural
violence, more specifically the relationship between language and antiblackness. The
latter is the mechanism used to create and maintain the ruse of analogy which hides the
nexus point of structural violence across categories of difference. I agree with Taney
when he stated, “Yet the men who framed this Declaration were…high in literary
acquirements…They perfectly understood the meaning of the language they used, and
how it would be understood by others; and they knew that it would not, in any part of the
civilizing world, be supposed to embrace the negro race…(490)” So, is the majority
opinion in the case of Dred Scott v. Sandford, 1857 an antiblack performative speech act?
I would argue yes because, while identity markers are typically read by most as
constatives that describe what is, they in fact function as performatives that enact what is
to become when put into the context of the larger historical discourse on blackness.
Dred Scott Decision as an Antiblack Performative Speech Act
Miron and Inda argue that race becomes a kind of speech act, a performative that
in the act of uttering brings into being that which it names. Justice Taney uses several
identity markers throughout the writing of the majority opinion. These identity markers
serve to name blackness in all of its various forms; African, slaves, negro/black. This act
of naming, through iteration, becomes a naturalizing effect that attempts to permanently
fix what blackness is and is to become. Stuart Hall (1997a) argued that popular
representations of everyday life under slavery clustered around two principles;
subordinate status and primitivism. Both of these principles can be found within the
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descriptions of blacks in the text. Taney explicitly describes Africans as “subordinate
(486)” and an “inferior class of beings (486).” Throughout the discussion on citizenship,
Taney continuously contrasts blackness with the more “civilized” parts of the world, in
essence, marking blackness as primitive. Butler (1993a) argued that discourse gains
“authority to bring about what it names through citing the conventions of authority (13).”
The capacity for the United States Supreme Court to set precedents inherently instills the
majority opinion with the force of authority needed for these naming conventions to be
cited, thus reiterated, over time. Understood in this manner, blackness, through
discourse, becomes a socially constructed category of knowledge that is historically
contingent. In other words, the majority opinion can be described as a kind of
performative speech act that named blackness, reiterated the representations of blackness,
and generated the force of authority that allows for further citation of those
representations of blackness.
Given the fact that Taney does not name in the first instance and that the text
represents citations from earlier descriptors, what makes this particular instance
significant? In order to understand the full effect and extent of the discourse used within
the text, the theory of antiblackness was used as an intervention into Miron and Inda’s
theory of race as a performative speech act. This intervention serves to explain the type
of unequal power relations, as articulated by Foucault, as it applies specifically and
uniquely to blackness. Hall (1997b) argued that Foucault “saw knowledge as always
inextricably enmeshed in relations of power because it was always being applied to the
regulation of social conduct in practice (47).” Foucault had the opportunity to put this
theoretical understanding in conversation with other theorists such as Karl Marx and
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Antonio Gramsci regarding class and ideology. However, it is equally important to
examine the concepts of discourse, knowledge and power in the context of newer
theorizations on antiblackness. Therefore, steps two and three of the analysis sought to
uncover the dynamics of antiblackness at play within the discursive formations of the
majority opinion.
Situating the analysis in the context of a theory of antiblackness allowed for the
use of a black/nonblack interpretive lens to explore the effects of power through
discourse on the socially constructed category of blackness. Foucault argued that power
does not function from the top down but instead circulates throughout society. However,
using the black/nonblack paradigmatic lens shows how the text mitigates this circulation
of power by situating blacks in an antagonistic relationship to the network. Within the
text blacks were situated outside the confines of “the people,” while the discourse within
the text remained just vague enough to allow for the inclusion of other racial and ethnic
groups.
Furthermore, revealing the instances of accumulation and fungibility in the text
offers new insights into the effects of power, discourse and historically contingent,
socially constructed knowledge. First, in the process of naming the black subject, Taney
went a step further and collapsed the various categories of blackness into one singular
category. The collapsing of the distinction between free and enslaved blacks resulted in
the descriptors used to describe the slaves, becoming exemplars for the category of black,
regardless of previously recognized statuses. These exemplars became an aspect of
antiblackness in the aftermath of slavery, via the racial corporeal schema. Once
blackness became synonymous with slaveness, the discourse of slave no longer needed to
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be present in order for the antiblack performative speech act to function successfully.
This is what Derrida was referring to when he developed the structure of absence theory
discussed on page 16 chapter one. Supplementation and representation act as markers
that carry the presupposed meaning inherent in such speech acts from its original
utterance into future discursive events.
Representation within antiblack performatives often functions via the corporeal
dimension, whereas the epidermalization of blackness functions as a linguistic marker
that signifies all that blackness has been described as and named. As a linguistic marker,
the racial corporeal schema attempts to void blackness of movement and repositions
blackness towards structural violence. One effect of the racial corporeal schema is the
idea of discursive capture, where epidermalization prevents a break from the cycle of
interpellation and marks the point of (re)capture. As blacks were reduced to one singular
category and tethered to the racial corporeal schema, the possibilities for rearticulating
what blackness is has been over coded by epidermal attachments to the sociohistorical
order. Looking back at the Black Power Movement example in chapter one, black was
introduced as a rearticulation of what it meant to be black as opposed to the common
terms nigger and negro that had been previously defined by the power structure. The
collapsing of blackness into one singular category provided the basis by which the
attempt at rearticulation could be captured and redeployed as synonymous with nigger
and negro. In other words, the power associated with the new term “black” was over
coded by the pathological associations that were attached to the previous names23. As
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Discursive capture is one of the dangers of flattening blackness. Increasing the infinite textures that
articulate what blackness is becomes a potential strategy for avoiding discursive capture. That would
require that blacks find value in various differences that unfold within the category of blackness.

74

one cannot hide their skin tone, the corporeal dimension provides an additive effect of
performative speech acts in relation to black subject constitution. Furthermore, the
corporeal dimension provides a means by which to assess other groups’ proximity to
blackness. For example, during the “War on Terror,” the racial corporeal schema served
as a linguistic marker to define who were considered “terrorists” without ever having to
say things like “the darker skinned-Muslims.”
Second, the instances of fungibility removes the essence of humanity from the
category of black. Recalling Winnubst’s definition of fungibility as the hollowing out of
human characteristics, provides the basis for the gratuitous violence that blacks have and
continue to experience and produced the effect introduced in chapter two, called doublespeak. Austin argued that a performative utterance can only be judged on the basis of its
success or failure, in which he identified the conditions for success. However, Austin did
not consider the possibility of contradiction in that a performative could meet all of the
conditions and be considered successful for one group while simultaneously not meeting
one or more of the conditions for another group. Within a single utterance, there can be
multiple meanings perceived. However, when there is a common sense meaning and a
meaning that exists in contradiction to that common sense meaning where one’s subject
position determines which meaning is perceived from that single utterance. That is what
is described here as double-speak. Double-speak reconceptualizes of the manner in
which performatives are interpreted across race. Put another way, performative speech
acts can have double meaning that on the one hand enables white innocence while
simultaneously performing antiblack violence. It is at the level of double-speak where
gratuitous violence becomes obscured. For example, as long as blacks are stripped of
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their human characteristics, it becomes easier to justify white police killings of unarmed
blacks despite the vow to serve and protect. In this example, the white killer is further
humanized because of their fear of the black victim, a nonhuman member of an “inferior
class of beings.” As a result, the successfulness of the vow remains intact for everyone
other than those who are deemed black or are structurally positioned in close proximity to
blackness. In essence, double-speak as an effect of antiblack performatives is partially
made possible through the fungibility of blackness and extends to other groups through
the relation of negation. As explained above, the discourse within the text of the majority
opinion laid the foundation for the paradox that allows for the contradiction found within
antiblack performatives.
Given the fact that for performatives it is not a question of true/false but of
successfulness, the burden of proof for evaluating the majority opinion as an antiblack
performative does not require proving truthfulness. Rather, the analysis should show that
the effects of the text as a speech act successfully performed an antiblackness. The
results from the analysis show several instances of accumulation and fungibility, thus
signaling the Dred Scott decision as an antiblack performative speech act.
Significant Contributions
All in all, this project is significant in two major ways. First, this work expands the
emerging genre of raciolinguistics by exploring an underdeveloped aspect of race and
language. Although sociolinguistics has a rich history of research surrounding race and
language, the more recent development of theories of Afropessimism provide an avenue
for exploring the impact of language on blacks beyond the use of African American
Vernacular English or as an identity category. Having a theoretical framework for
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conceptualizing blackness as an antagonistic structural position has the potential to offer
new insights into the role that language plays within contemporary discussions of
antiracism.
Second, by putting theories of antiblackness in conversation with scholarly
discussions surrounding performative speech acts, this project has laid the foundation for
uncovering more aspects related to the functionality of performative speech acts. Here I
have identified two new aspects, double-speak and the impact of the racial corporeal
schema on performatives. Where double-speak is an effect of antiblack performative
speech acts, the racial corporeal schema is a contributing factor to its functionality.
Future Research
Saidiya Hartman (2007) describes a heightened incidence of “premature death” as
a perennial feature and function of the “afterlife of slavery.” Hartman writes, “If slavery
persists as an issue in the political life of black America, it is not because of an
antiquarian obsession with bygone days or the burden of a too-long memory, but because
black lives are still imperiled and devalued by a racial calculus and a political arithmetic
that were entrenched centuries ago. This is the afterlife of slavery — skewed life chances,
limited access to health and education, premature death, incarceration, and
impoverishment (6).” Language is one of the pinnacle tools used in the maintenance of
that afterlife. Yet, the relationship between language and structural antiblackness
remains understudied. So much of the scholarship surrounding language and blackness
tends to focus on the use of African American Vernacular English or identity studies.
Very little research has examined the nature and extent to which antiblackness over codes
much of the language used to shape black life and the world’s understanding of it. As a
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structural phenomenon, antiblackness implicates every institution in this country.
Therefore, discursive examination of the ways that language, directly or indirectly, has
been used to maintain the structure of antiblackness within these institutions must
become a priority if we ever want exit the period that Walcott calls, “the long
emancipation—defined as the continuation of the juridical and legislative status of Black
nonbeing (3).” Walcott contends that the long emancipation is held together by the
legacies of a juridical emancipated black status that remains tied to the social relations
and former conditions of enslavement. I take this a step further and maintain that the
antiblack performative speech acts uttered during slavery and their iteration throughout
the afterlife of slavery continues to underpin and structure those social relations.
As such, it is imperative that scholars do the work of exposing antiblack
performative speech acts and their origins within every institution in this country.
Examples of this work could include exploring the historical relationship between
language and the over policing of black neighborhoods, language and the
disproportionate application of punishment of black students in schools, language and
black maternal health disparities, and the list could go on. The point is that language
drives perceptions and perceptions shape realities. As long as the logics of antiblackness
persist through language, blacks will never achieve full citizenship, belonging, thus
emancipation.
Shortcomings
Although this work provides a framework for studying antiblack performative
speech acts, the long history of antiblackness makes finding origins difficult if not
impossible. However, referring back to the discussion of performativity, Butler (1988)
reminds us that there is no reference to a pure subject. Confirmed by Miron and Inda’s
78

contention that race, thus blackness, is an empty category. Therefore, through discourse,
subjects are continuously being enacted. Taken up any instance in time or space where
blackness is being constituted through discourse makes for a worthwhile scholarly
endeavor.
I also acknowledge that it is highly unusual to posit a theory of antiblack
performative speech acts while also having that as part of the research question. Even
still, while the conclusion articulates the theory as a whole, the parts of the theory were
built into the chapters leading up to the methodology. This could be made clear if one
were to think of the theory chapter as an intervention into the previous literature on
performative speech acts. The results should be understood as the evidence used to
validate the significance of that intervention. By no means do I contend that this theory
of antiblack performative speech acts is complete but it lays the foundation for further
development. Additionally, the concept of double-speak that was developed from this
project is an important one that should be taken up in future research surrounding the
social and material implications of antiblack discourse. Lastly, understanding Fanon’s
concept of the racial corporeal schema in the context of the literature on linguistic
markers is novel and worthy of acknowledgement and exploration.
Final Thoughts: Ontologies
These results represent how the world understands and structures blackness.
However, it does not represent the “ontology” of blackness because black is always
becoming. Ontology, metaphysical or otherwise, seems to be the focus of discussions of
being, rather than becoming, within philosophical circles. Unfortunately, ontology only
describes the what, not the how or the why. This particular exercise in discursive
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analysis has exposed two things regarding the dangers of prioritizing metaphysical
ontology as descriptive of being. First, is that ontology is only a perception of the what
from the outside looking in, not the reality of what. Second, is that ontology, when
attached to group descriptors such as racial categories, push us towards universal
understandings of ontology for those particular groups, flattening and distorting their
individual relationship to the world. Furthermore, becoming gets blocked for blacks by
the rhetorical contradictions of double-speak that allows for individuality for some but
creates the burden of blackness for others. Instead, we should liken our understanding of
ontology to the word truth(s) in that there are multiple ontologies, individual ontologies
that develop through relationality. It is through this notion of relationality that blacks are
individually becoming and not tethered to the perceptions of the name that the world gave
them. Relationality is the point where agency is activated. However, it is not
relationality that is built from the identity that was defined for them but relationality
based on that which they seek to create for themselves. Desires must transcend the space
of negation, tap into the space of the unthought as a possibility, in order to produce
futures that redefine what it means to be human. In order to do this, we must fully
understand that which has been thought, then move into the space of the unknown. It is
my hope here, that I have contributed to a deeper understanding of the previously thought
in order to move us towards the unthought where “us” is still yet to be defined. In fact, I
contend that resignification should not be the goal because resignification happens from
the point of the created subject. Instead, we should strive for non-articulation. We
should seek to break the tether to that which has defined blackness for so long. I do not
suggest here that we dismiss the history that has brought us to this contemporary
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moment, rather we should be hyper aware, in our studies, of the intricacies of language
that sustain the sociohistorical order in an effort to forge a different future, in our
language, thoughts and desires, that transcend that which defines blackness. We must
look for the excess to blackness and begin to build communities from there. Hartman
(1997) speaks to something similar in her discussion of building community through
sociality where the networks we build “are not reducible to race but are understood in
terms of the possibilities of resistance conditioned by relations of power and the very
purposeful and self-conscious effort to build community (59).” Whereas, Hartman
focuses on the manner in which we build, I contend that there must also be special
attention paid to how we talk about building community.
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